

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO AFRICA

(February 28 - March 21, 1957)

DETAILED CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

April 5, 1957.

I. French Relations with North Africa.

French prestige and influence in North Africa are decreasing at an alarming rate. This is due to a number of causes:

A. The perpetuation of the Algerian war which is poisoning the atmosphere of all of North Africa from Morocco to Libya and is now beginning to reach down into Mauretania in French West Africa.

B. French failure to behave in their relations with Morocco and Tunisia in accordance with the requirements of the independence of those countries. Thus the French still maintain large military forces in Morocco and Tunisia in an uncertainly defined status and to deploy them with little if any regard for the sovereignty of those countries. At the same time, the French exploit the financial dependence of these countries on France in an effort to force compliance with French policies and actions with respect to Algeria. However understandable French attitudes on these questions may be, such tactics are bound to exacerbate relations and, in the long term, run the real risk of the loss of the French position in Morocco and Tunisia.

C. The growing belief of many in North Africa that France cannot over a long period marshal sufficient strength to win a military victory in North Africa and that they can therefore afford to hold out for a solution of the Algerian problem which will assure either immediate independence or independence within the foreseeable future. Thus, the more time that passes, the more intransigent the North Africans are likely to become.

Recommendations:

A. That the United States Government urgently consider a plan of action, which, while recognizing French interests and sensitivities, is calculated to awaken France to the extreme dangers which she faces and to which she is exposing the entire West in North Africa. We should make it clear that we have no desire to supplant France and, on the contrary, are concerned that she maintain a position of influence and assistance in this area.

B. That

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B. That the United States Government move as rapidly as possible to assure the continued pro-Western orientation and moderate nature of the Governments of North Africa by cementing our own relations with those countries. To this end, the United States should:

1. Invite the Sultan of Morocco to visit the United States this year. (I attach the greatest importance to this, having assured the Sultan of our desire to receive him as soon as arrangements can be worked out.)
2. Avoid any identification with repressive features of French policies in Algeria and make clear as necessary that we expect France to respect the sovereignty of Tunisia and Morocco.
3. Proceed as rapidly as possible to implement our aid programs with Morocco and Tunisia. While the programs this year may be acceptable in size, we should anticipate increasing needs and demands for larger programs next year.
4. Conclude as quickly as possible an agreement with Morocco to adapt our base rights arrangements with France to the new fact of Moroccan sovereignty. The present absence of a direct understanding with Morocco stands in danger of affecting the whole range of our relations with that country.
5. Undertake a confidential study of how the stability and pro-Western orientation of Morocco and Tunisia could be assured in the event a rupture should result in the denial of the annual French subsidies of \$80 million to Morocco and \$50 million to Tunisia.

II. Relations of African States with Egypt.

Nasser's influence on the masses of the people in North Africa, the Sudan and the Moslem portions of Ethiopia remains high although probably less so than before his defeat by the Israelis. On the other hand, the Governments of those countries see in Nasser a threat to their independence and are therefore cautious in their attitudes towards him. In many cases, they have courageously opposed him. Libya, Tunisia and Morocco are now tending to look toward close cooperation among themselves to enhance their combined capability to resist Nasserism. Ethiopia and the Sudan also seem to be taking the first cautious steps for cooperation among themselves toward the same end.

Egyptian propaganda, particularly radio broadcasts, is highly effective among the Moslem populations of the countries we visited. This contrasts with the ineffectiveness of our own propaganda efforts. I believe that Egyptian efforts can be combatted effectively only by

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building up the indigenous broadcasting capabilities of the states of the area. Thus a Radio Morocco, Radio Tunisia, etc. would be much more effective than an expansion of VOA facilities in this area.

Recommendation:

That while avoiding any appearance of isolating Egypt, we quietly encourage and assist these states, both individually and collectively, to resist the efforts of Egypt to dominate them.

That funds which might otherwise be used for the expansion of VOA facilities in this area be utilized by USIA to strengthen the signal of potentially friendly indigenous radio stations in these countries.

III. Attitudes Towards Israel.

In the Arab countries which I visited, I made a point of talking to their leaders about the danger of the Middle Eastern situation and of eliciting their views about an Arab-Israel settlement. I found that almost without exception the leaders were realistic in privately recognizing that the Arabs must adjust themselves to the fact of Israel's existence. At the same time, they emphasized that the major obstacle which in their view stands in the way of a more open acceptance of Israel is the Arab refugee problem. They urged that close attention be given to the settlement of this problem both because of the moral and human issues involved and because of the contribution it would make to Middle East peace and stability.

Recommendation:

That we give new and careful attention to the Arab refugee problem with a view towards evolving a plan which at the appropriate time could form the basis for an equitable settlement.

IV. Ghana.

Ghana has many growing pains. It has great assets in terms of functioning institutions, responsible leadership and enthusiasm, but it also has liabilities in terms of the constitutional dispute now going on between the proponents of a strong central government and those who desire a large degree of regional autonomy for the native states. Moreover, the economy of Ghana is extremely vulnerable to the extent that it is largely based on cocoa, which has fluctuated widely in price over the period of the last few years. The Government of Ghana is anxious to diversify the economy and is particularly interested in the Volta River scheme for hydro-electric and irrigation development. The realization of this project would permit the production of

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large quantities of aluminum from the extensive bauxite deposits which are found within the country. The cost of the project is formidable -- about \$1 billion.

The Prime Minister and other responsible leaders of Ghana emphasized to us their desire for strong United States representation in Ghana. They want an experienced officer capable of giving them the best possible advice during the difficult period ahead.

Recommendations:

1. That we assign our ambassadors to Ghana on the basis of merit, experience and absence of prejudice. I understand that we are about to assign an experienced Foreign Service Officer as Ambassador. He should arrive as soon as possible.

2. That we follow most closely the evolution of this state, realizing that its success or failure is going to have profound effect upon the future of this part of Africa.

3. That we show ourselves sympathetic to assisting Ghana through technical cooperation, economic aid, etc., during the difficult period ahead. This assistance should be regarded as supplementary to any assistance the British provide. We should particularly follow closely the Volta River scheme with a view toward ascertaining whether it is a well-conceived and practical project which we should support in the IBRD and perhaps aid to a limited extent ourselves.

V. Liberia.

I was deeply concerned by conditions in Liberia. Contrasted with Ghana, Liberia is politically, economically and socially far less developed. The governmental structure corresponds closely to that of a Latin American type dictatorship, with a strong, although comparatively enlightened man, exercising virtually dictatorial powers. There is no opposition party and, so far as I could see, no potential leaders of the calibre of President Tubman.

It is perhaps too easy to excuse Liberia's deficiencies. The country has not had the same advantages as the Gold Coast, where a foreign power has provided extensive funds and assistance in the development of the country. Although Liberia has historically been a responsibility of the United States for over a century, it was not until 1944 that we began to assist the country to develop economically and socially. Private enterprise is now starting to play an increasingly important role in the development of the country and economic conditions should improve as more rubber acreage is brought into cultivation and as the

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country's considerable mineral resources are exploited. Some additional United States technical and economic assistance will undoubtedly be required, particularly with respect to education, the road program and agricultural development.

Liberia's greatest need, however, is for strong and patient advice in developing the political and social bases of the nation so as to bring about effective representation of all elements of the population in the national life.

Recommendations:

1. We must find ways and means of strengthening our ability to give the Liberians the advice and assistance which they require to broaden the base of the nation. This will often be advice which they do not wish to hear and any program of this kind will require careful consideration in order to get the essential points across without offending Liberian sensibilities and becoming counter-productive.

2. We should stand ready to increase in moderate amounts our grant and loan assistance to Liberia to assist in the development of the country.

VI. Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is ruled by a highly sophisticated and cultured minority -- the Amharas. The large Moslem minority plays little role in the political life of the country. The Ethiopians are currently concerned about the potential for subversion which Colonel Nasser has among the Moslem populations. The first general elections in the history of the country are due to be held in the Fall, but it remains to be seen to what extent these will give effective representation in the Parliament to the minority groups. One has the impression that Ethiopia is looking more to maintaining the status quo by strengthening its armed forces than it is to a program of political, economic and social reform which, in the long run, will probably be more effective in assuring the loyalty of its populations and the stability of the area.

There have been in recent years a series of misunderstandings between the United States and Ethiopia. The Ethiopians maintain, for whatever motives, that we are not living up to the impressions they received regarding our plans and intentions at the time of the base agreement in 1953 and the Emperor's visit to Washington in 1955 with regard to assisting Ethiopia to build up its armed forces. The Emperor made this case very forcibly to me and emphasized the need for a re-examination of relations between our two countries. I am assured that there has been no failure on our part to live up to our promises

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and I believe that many of the difficulties which have arisen are the result of misunderstandings which must be set straight as rapidly as possible.

Recommendations:

1. That our new Ambassador arrive in Addis Ababa as quickly as possible and that his first task should be a thorough exploration of the whole range of United States-Ethiopian relations with a view toward identifying precise points at issue and taking corrective action.
2. That the Department of Defense review its attitude toward the Ethiopian armed forces with a view to deciding whether, in the light of Ethiopia's contribution to the UN action in Korea and its general attachment to the principles of collective security, it would not be in our military interest to encourage the building of an efficient fighting force in Ethiopia.
3. That in order to reassure the Ethiopians of our good intentions and our desire to assist them, we increase moderately the size of our military and economic programs. I believe this will be necessary in any event if we are to secure the additional base facilities we are now seeking. This should be done this year if possible, but, in any event, next year.
4. That the Department of Defense review our current military programs in Ethiopia with a view toward speeding up their implementation and assuring that Ethiopia receives the most serviceable equipment possible.
5. That ICA similarly speed up the implementation of our economic programs.

VII. Sudan.

The Sudan appears to be suffering at the present time from internal political dissension. The Prime Minister gives the impression of a strong man who is pro-Western and anti-Communist and who is making a bid to consolidate his power. The Foreign Minister, who appears to be powerful, is much less well-disposed toward the United States. I believe that we should be wary of him and stand ready to throw our support to the Prime Minister as appropriate opportunities arrive.

I believe that the Sudan will at least tacitly support the American Doctrine for the Middle East. In any event, it desires United States assistance.

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The Sudan has ties both with the Middle East (particularly Egypt) and with Africa. I believe it to be in our interest to try to orient that country towards Africa and away from embroilment in Middle Eastern politics.

Recommendations:

1. That we support the Prime Minister, who appears inclined to be pro-American and anti-Communist.
2. That we proceed as rapidly as possible with a program of economic and technical assistance for the Sudan.
3. That in order to facilitate efforts to orient the Sudan towards Africa, it be included in the jurisdiction of the new Bureau of African Affairs when the latter is set up.

VIII. Libya.

Libya is a deficit economy. The position and intentions of the British are increasingly uncertain. The country occupies a key strategic position with respect to North Africa and the flank of NATO. We cannot afford to lose Libya. I understand that the British are presently contemplating a substantial withdrawal of forces and a cut-back in their budgetary support. I do not believe that we can afford to let a vacuum develop in Libya. This matter assumes greater importance when one considers the \$100 million investment we have in strategic facilities as well as the additional requirements which we may have in that country. The present government is well-disposed toward the United States. It deserves our support.

Recommendations:

1. That we stand ready to support the Libyan Government financially at such time as the British withdraw their financial support.
2. That we assist the Libyan Government to decrease its heavy dependence upon Egyptian personnel.
3. That we continue to increase moderately our program of economic assistance.
4. That we give sympathetic consideration to the building of a Libyan Army which would help to unify the country and fill the internal security vacuum which will be created by British withdrawal.

IX. North African

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IX. North African University.

Libya is presently engaged in building a national university. Both Morocco and Tunisia are greatly interested in assistance in expanding their existing institutions of higher education. None of these countries (with the possible exception of Morocco) has the individual resources or capability of creating a first-class university. I believe that they would be receptive to the idea of combining their resources, with some assistance from us, to build a university which would meet their common needs. Because of sectional differences among the various states of North Africa, it would probably be desirable to establish such a university with various branches located in the different countries in a manner analogous to the state university system in California. Thus, an agricultural faculty might be located in one country, and law, medicine, engineering etc., in another.

Recommendation:

That in view of the great importance of increasing higher education in North Africa, the interested agencies of the United States Government give high priority to exploring the possibility of assisting the North African countries to build a North African University with appropriate United States private and/or Governmental assistance.

X. General.Recommendations:

1. That the Department of Defense and the ICA give higher priority than in the past to their programs and operations in the African area.
2. That the Department of State take immediate steps to strengthen its representation in Africa, both quantitatively and qualitatively. To the extent that this requires increased personnel, the opening of new posts and the granting of additional funds to ameliorate the conditions of service of our officers in the field, the Administration should give urgent consideration to requesting the necessary funds from the Congress.
3. Assignments of United States representatives in the African area should be made on the basis of merit, experience and stability. We must assure that our African posts are staffed by our most highly qualified people if we are to meet the high standards of competition presently set by the Russians, Egyptians and others.
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4. We should be sensitive to the fact that new states will be emerging from among the present dependent territories in Africa. We should begin to lay our plans for conducting direct relations with those states and for assuring that when they emerge into independent status, we have laid the best possible foundation for a close relationship with the United States. To the extent that this may require moderate amounts of technical and economic assistance to the dependent territories, we should be prepared to extend such aid. An immediate survey should be made to determine to what extent such programs would further the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

5. I believe that we often dissipate much of the political good will which our aid programs should engender by too much insistence on detail in our agreements with and programs in recipient countries, by slowness in implementing programs and by falsely raising expectations by engaging in too much planning for projects which have little, if any, hope of realization. These aspects of our aid programs should be carefully reviewed in an effort to assure the maximum political impact. In the new programs which we shall be implementing in Africa, we should make every effort to avoid the pitfalls we have encountered in other parts of the world.

6. We must look most carefully at our information output which, I suspect, is by no means as effective as that being disseminated by the Communists. In several places I was told by responsible African leaders that our points of view were not getting across. I believe it vital that we find out why and take corrective action.

There are attached copies of memoranda of the major talks I had with leaders of the countries which I visited.

Attachments:

Tab A - Memorandum-Morocco

Tab B - Memorandum-Ghana

Tab C - Memorandum-Liberia

Tab D - Memoranda-Ethiopia

1. Conversation with Prime Minister
2. Conversation with the Emperor
3. Conversation with Foreign Minister.
4. Conversation with Minister of Defense
5. Conversation with Foreign Minister and John Spencer
6. Summary of Remarks Made by the Emperor
7. Statement of Defense Problems of Ethiopia.
8. Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tab E - Memorandum-The Sudan

Tab F - Memorandum-Libya

Tab G - Memorandum-Tunisia

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TAB A.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Rabat, Morocco
March 2, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS: Moroccan: His Majesty Mohamed V, Sultan of Morocco
His Royal Highness Moulay Hassan, Crown
Prince of Morocco
His Excellency Si M'Barek Bekkai, Prime
Minister of Morocco
His Excellency Ahmed Balafrej, Minister
of Foreign Affairs

American: The Vice President of the United States,
Richard M. Nixon
The Honorable Cavendish W. Cannon, U.S.
Ambassador to Morocco

Following a luncheon given by the Sultan at the Palace, the Sultan withdrew with the Vice President for a personal conversation which lasted about an hour and a quarter. The Sultan began with a fifteen minute discussion of Morocco's problems. The first topic was the particular situation and series of problems of newly independent Morocco and the difficulties which the Government of Morocco faces in consolidating its position at a time when the general world situation is so tense. The Sultan spoke of Morocco's economic difficulties and the element of urgency in facing up to the unemployment problem as well as the necessity for general social programs in order to satisfy a people feeling its way to independent status. The Sultan referred to the particular relations between Morocco and the U.S. as being conditioned by the question of the air bases and pointed out that it was quite urgent that this matter be adjusted. The Sultan stated that he desires this to be done in a spirit of friendship and co-operation and with a realization of the common problems affecting both of our countries.

As regards the American attitude toward Morocco and toward the Arab states of the Middle East, the Sultan seemed to find great comfort in the position taken by the U.S. He referred to the recent visit of King Saud who had explained to him in full detail much of the background of the President's policy towards that area which the Sultan said he could fully

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endorse. He felt that the President's Doctrine, and American policy in general, is such that Morocco could generally give its support because, as a result of its geographical position and previous history, Morocco is not so intricately engaged in local problems as are the countries of the Middle East.

As for Communism, the Sultan said he was not disturbed at the present time but realized it was necessary to keep up a common front against agitators who would take every advantage of stress or uncertainty in Morocco in order to promote political ends which would not be to the advantage of the Moroccan people.

Speaking of Africa generally, he observed that we must expect a great development in the next few years and expressed the hope that Morocco would be able to exert its good influences for an orderly evolution of nationalist tendencies in North Africa and, perhaps, the continent in general.

The Vice President replied on each of the topics raised by the Sultan in a frank and straightforward manner which obviously pleased both the Sultan and his Foreign Minister. The Vice President said he would report His Majesty's views directly to the President as was his custom. Concerning U.S. bases, the Vice President said that he realizes very well that conditions under which the American bases were established in Morocco have been considerably changed and it is perfectly evident that our situation should be regularized. The Vice President continued by saying that we wanted this done in such a way as to be fully compatible with Moroccan interests and that Moroccan interests would determine the basis on which we would maintain our establishments in Morocco. The Vice President expressed confidence that this matter could be worked out in a spirit of good will and friendship. The Vice President also pointed out that the maintenance of these bases is not only to the interest of the U.S. but very definitely in the interest of Morocco and the free world in general.

As regards economic aid, the Vice President discerned two aspects: (1) Our definite interest in the welfare and progress of Morocco, (2) The practical relationship between a sound economic situation here and our military position. The Vice President went into some detail regarding the legislative requirements of U.S. aid programs, pointing out that we are answerable to Congress, that we have programs with many countries, with Congress having control over the funds and that the President himself cannot always do as much as he would like or as quickly as he desires.

Notwithstanding this, the Vice President said that he felt sure that Moroccan requirements would receive very sympathetic consideration,

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adding that we should get the program into operation as soon as possible and that the various elements of the program could be worked out as time goes on. The Vice President added that we expect Morocco to take advantage of aid from other sources, including France.

The Vice President then asked the Sultan what he thought might be done about the Algerian problem, emphasizing that it would be better, in our view, to seek a peaceful and evolutionary solution rather than to allow violent events to provide the basis for the outcome. The Sultan said that Moroccans are naturally very deeply concerned about the Algerian question. They feel that the nationalist trend must be taken into account and that eventually there must be an acknowledgment of Algerian aspirations to independence. The Sultan agreed, however, that we should seek every means for a peaceful solution. He said that he had tried very hard to bring that about, but unfortunately had failed in his efforts up to now. The Sultan expressed the thought that the best procedure now would be to proceed toward elections which would be controlled by the U.N. and said he hoped this could be done in such a way that there would not be a period of violence in Algeria.

During the course of the audience, the Sultan indicated obliquely his strong desire to visit the U.S. In view of the history of this problem, including the Sultan's plans for a visit last fall, and the Sultan's evident desire in the matter, the Vice President resorted to a general expression of hope that the visit could be arranged for some time in the future, adding that he hoped he would still be in the Vice Presidential office at the time and that he would consequently have the pleasure of seeing the Sultan in the U.S. Despite the efforts of the Vice President to project the visit somewhat indefinitely into the future, the reaction of the Sultan and the members of his government were such as to indicate that he would expect this matter to be followed up in the very near future.

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TAB B

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Consulate General
Accra, Gold Coast
March 4, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS: Ghanaian: His Excellency Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana
His Excellency A. L. Adu, Secretary for External Affairs

American: Vice President of the United States
Richard M. Nixon
Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Donald W. Lamm, American Consul General

After welcoming the Vice President, the Prime Minister inquired about the President's health. The Vice President replied that the President happily had recovered fully and was basically in excellent health although he had recently been bothered by a cold.

The Vice President expressed his pleasure that he was able to be present at the Ghana independence ceremonies and congratulated the Prime Minister on his country's joining the family of nations. He said that he had been greatly impressed by the ovation which the Prime Minister had received when he arrived at the religious ceremonies yesterday and added smilingly that he thought the Prime Minister should have no difficulty in getting himself elected to office in this country. He then asked if the Prime Minister would like to expound on the current problems which Ghana faces.

The Prime Minister thanked the Vice President for his remarks about his political popularity. He confessed to some weariness at the heavy political burdens he was carrying and said that at times he was tempted to throw it all over. Recovering his enthusiasm, he said that his main preoccupation, now that Ghana is about to attain political independence, is to assure the country's economic independence. History has shown that political and economic independence must proceed pari passu and that the former cannot be effective without the latter. He pointed out that Ghana's economy is primarily agricultural and

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heavily dependent on cocoa. This means that the health of its economy is directly related to the price of cocoa which has fluctuated widely. Only a year ago cocoa brought £500 per ton. Currently the price has dropped to £180. The Prime Minister said that he was concerned about the unhealthy situation created by such heavy reliance on one crop and was therefore anxious to diversify the economy both by general agricultural development and by exploiting the country's mineral resources-- particularly bauxite. There were other possibilities as well. For example, a contract has recently been signed with an American company for petroleum exploration.

The Vice President said that he had encountered similar situations elsewhere in the world where countries' economies were heavily dependent on one crop. He mentioned as cases in point the heavy reliance of Cuba on sugar exports and San Salvador on coffee. He went on to express agreement with the Prime Minister's assessment of the importance of economic independence, stating that the experience of the United States has made us acutely aware of this fact. He pointed out that 180 years ago when we obtained our independence, we had about half the population of Ghana and were also primarily an agricultural nation. We had seen the necessity for diversification and had thus laid the foundations for the great expansion of our economy which subsequently took place. He felt that Ghana also had the natural wealth and human resources for a great development, but cautioned against excessive expectations from such uncertainties as oil. This should be regarded as a bonus if it materializes but should not form a basis for planning.

The Vice President's analogy about the early history of the United States seemed to catch the Prime Minister's imagination. He spoke with pleasure of his ten years in the United States and his admiration for that country. He remarked somewhat parenthetically that he would very much like to travel again but that his local political preoccupations would probably make this impossible for some time.

Reverting to the Volta River Project, he said that the Preparatory Commission's report had shown the project to be eminently sound from an engineering point of view. Unfortunately, however, there is the matter of financing. Ghana had managed to set aside about £60 millions for development. These funds are presently uncommitted and his hope was to use them as a contribution to the Volta project if the other financing problems could be solved. The Prime Minister went on to say that British and Canadian aluminum interests were also sympathetic and might participate. Finally the IBRD had surveyed the Ghana economy and the feasibility of the project and he was now awaiting their report. This project, he felt, would go far towards realizing Ghana's goal of economic independence.

The Vice

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The Vice President listened sympathetically to the Prime Minister's exposition. He said that this was obviously a matter for exploration with the interested British, Canadian and IBRD interests but assured the Prime Minister that the United States would continue to watch the situation carefully. The Vice President then went on to refer to the great contribution which private enterprise could make to the economic strengthening of underdeveloped countries. He explained the techniques which Puerto Rico has so successfully employed in "OPERATION BOOTSTRAP".

The Prime Minister indicated awareness of the Puerto Rican experiment and said that although he had never met Governor Manoz, he has been in correspondence with him.

Dr. Nkrumah went on to say that Ghana has been aware of the desirability of attracting private investment. While the Government believes that certain economic facilities should properly be state-owned, it nevertheless has taken steps to encourage private investment through measures for tax relief, land tenure, etc. The Vice President said that he was glad to hear this.

There followed a brief discussion of U.S. plans for technical assistance (agriculture, veterinary and community development). The Vice President said that while the programs which the United States contemplate this year are modest, they can be of great assistance in training Ghanians for specific tasks. He spoke particularly of the value of pilot projects and of teaching by example, referring to the success of the village method in India. The Prime Minister indicated agreement with these statements.

The Vice President said that he had heard about some of the internal constitutional difficulties which Ghana is facing. He added that he would not presume to comment on Ghana's internal affairs but, drawing again from United States experience, he thought that he might point out that we had similarly been forced to face up to the issues of centralism versus localism in the first years of the Republic. We had eventually resolved the problem in favor of the advantages of a large degree of centralism. All such basic problems have to be worked out in a spirit of compromise and he had no doubt that Ghana would resolve the matter in this same way. The Prime Minister indicated his agreement and referred in this connection to the recent constitutional discussions which would vest considerable power in the regional assemblies. He said Ghana would have to see how these compromises work out during the next few years.

The Vice President said that he had read and heard much about the foreign policy which Ghana would follow after independence. He asked

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whether he would be correct in describing Ghana's policy as "nationalist". He said he disliked the term "neutralist" which he did not find really descriptive of the policies of nations in Ghana's position. He thought that "nationalist" more accurately described the fact that such nations are determined to secure and defend their independence. He felt this distinction was important. The United States has shown by words and actions its devotion to the principle of independence. We believe that the best assurance we can have of our own independence is the independence of others. Unfortunately, other countries are not so motivated.

The Prime Minister said that the Vice President had accurately expressed Ghana's position. Ghana's policy, he said, will be one of non-involvement and non-alignment in the East-West struggle. "But", he said, "Ghana can never be neutral". It will jealously safeguard its independence and resist all efforts at domination. Mr. Adu intervened at this point to say that although no final decisions had yet been taken, Ghana might find it necessary to establish some kind of representation with the Soviet bloc. Dr. Nkrumah confirmed this, adding that the only firm decisions which had been taken were with respect to opening diplomatic missions in Washington, London, Paris and Monrovia.

• The Vice President said that he presumed that Ghana would vigorously support freedom of speech, press, religion, and the other democratic traditions. Dr. Nkrumah was emphatic in his concurrence indicating that Ghana was firmly committed to parliamentary democracy and the democratic way of life.

The Vice President reiterated his pleasure at being present at this historic occasion. He emphasized the importance of the events which are taking place in Ghana to the whole future development of this part of Africa. The Prime Minister said that he agreed completely with the Vice President and similarly looked forward to a great future for this part of Africa.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Monrovia, Liberia
March 8, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS: Liberian: His Excellency William V. S. Tubman,
President of Liberia
His Excellency Momolu Dukuly,
Secretary of State of Liberia
His Excellency George A. Padmore,
Liberian Ambassador to the United States

American: Vice President of the United States
Richard M. Nixon
Richard Lee Jones, United States
Ambassador to Liberia
Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs

After Ambassador Jones' dinner at the Embassy, the above-mentioned officials adjourned for a private discussion of matters of mutual concern to Liberia and the United States.

The Vice President asked if there were any matters which President Tubman particularly wished to draw to his attention. President Tubman replied that there were two main matters which he had on his mind:

1. Military Assistance.

President Tubman spoke about Liberia's vulnerability to external attack, tracing the history of British and French detachment of Liberian territory which he ascribed to the fact that Liberia has in the past been incapable of defending itself and unable to depend on other powers, particularly the United States, to protect it. He also cited, in this connection, the German submarine attack on Monrovia during World War I and the fact that it took allied vessels eight days to reach Liberian waters after the incident took place. He said that the United States and Liberia are now joined in a defense effort, since the United States retains the right to utilize Robertsfield and the Port of Monrovia in the event of war. This cooperation, he maintained, increases Liberia's vulnerability. What Liberia basically needs is the capability to hold

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off any enemy attack until assistance can come from the United States. He stated that the United States could help Liberia in developing this capability. He then went on to speak about difficulties which Liberia has encountered in connection with reimbursable military assistance, mentioning that last year Liberia was granted over \$200,000 in reimbursable aid. Although only about one-half of this equipment has been delivered, Liberia was asked a few months ago to pay for the entire amount. It did so, but is still awaiting the remaining deliveries. Vice President Nixon said that we would look into this matter as soon as possible with a view toward expediting delivery.

2. Roads.

President Tubman said that Liberia needs many things: public buildings, advice on public administration, et cetera. Many foreign interests are seeking to extend help to Liberia. For example, both Italian and German interests have expressed willingness to advance money for roads and housing construction and British interests have offered to do the same with respect to ore carrying vessels which would eventually become Liberian-owned if the Liberian Government can work out a suitable arrangement for the employment of these vessels by the Liberian Mining Company. The President said that he was reluctant to do business with these foreign interests and desired instead to look primarily to the United States. He indicated that Liberia does not desire grant assistance but is capable of proceeding on a loan basis. He went on to emphasize that Liberia's greatest need is for roads, and that these are of higher priority than the other items mentioned. The United States has been helpful in this regard, the Exim Bank having extended two loans--one for \$5 million and the other for \$15 million. He understood that the Exim Bank felt that this was all that Liberia's credit status would permit it to extend at the present time, but maintained that the Exim Bank's analysis of the Liberian financial position had been predicated on annual revenues of about \$9 million a year whereas those revenues are now approximately \$18 million a year. The present road program would still leave a substantial gap in what is needed to open up the country and Liberia therefore strongly hopes that an additional \$10 million can be authorized to complete the road program--particularly the link from Bomi Hills to Kolahun. Mr. Palmer said that we agree with the high priority which Liberia ascribes to its road program. He thought that we should get on with the present program and see how that went and then, perhaps, we could consider whether further assistance might be required and possible. Ambassador Jones pointed out that the Raymond Concrete Pile Company would have extensive equipment and personnel here in connection with the \$15 million road program which should permit it to tender a lower bid for any additional work. The Vice President confirmed United States sympathy for the

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Liberian road program and said that we would watch the situation carefully.

The Vice President then turned to the future of West Africa. He spoke of his appraisal of recent events in Ghana and the great possibilities which they hold for encouraging political and economic evolution in this area in a peaceful and democratic way. At the same time, he expressed concern at the potential for Communist subversion which will exist in the period immediately ahead while Ghana is formulating its domestic and foreign policies. He said that he felt that Liberia as the oldest independent state in West Africa and Ghana as the newest have important and unique responsibilities in this area. The independence of Ghana has focused world attention on West Africa and the success which both Ghana and Liberia have in orderly development will have a profound effect on the future of the dependent areas of Africa South of the Sahara, on the so-called colonial powers and on the world in general. He said that he thought that Liberia, and President Tubman in particular, had much experience and wisdom which could be used to good effect in Ghana. He asked President Tubman what his estimate was of Nkrumah and the Ghana Government.

President Tubman recalled various exchanges which he had had with Nkrumah in the past. He said that in the earlier days of Nkrumah's struggle for independence he had attempted to persuade Nkrumah to take a more moderate line in his relations with the British. He said that he had pointed out at that time that Ghana had profited greatly from its association with Britain and had told Nkrumah that he thought he would do well to think in terms of continuing that tie through membership in the British Commonwealth. He said that Nkrumah had taken this advice in the spirit in which it had been offered and he felt that he had considerable influence with him. He went on to say that Nkrumah has, of course, something of a Marxist background. He agreed with the Vice President's statement of the dangers of Communism in West Africa and said that he had urged Nkrumah not to permit the Communists to gain a foothold in that area. He said that Liberia would soon be opening an Embassy at Accra and that he would send a strong Ambassador there who could help in developing the sort of relations between Ghana and Liberia of which the Vice President had spoken.

The Vice President then spoke of the importance of the West Africans working out their own policies in accordance with their own requirements as independent states and not just following the Arab-Asian bloc or other interests which do not necessarily coincide with their own. He suggested that perhaps an African bloc which viewed African interests on their merits would be salutary. President Tubman signified his agreement with these thoughts.

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The Vice President suggested that there was much that President Tubman could do himself. He thought that if, at an appropriate time, President Tubman could indicate to Nkrumah his desire to visit Accra, it might provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on these important subjects and that perhaps President Tubman could be influential in encouraging Nkrumah to undertake policies which would be in the interest of the Free World. He said that he did not think that he could expect Ghana to adopt the same attitudes in its foreign policy as the United States, but the important thing is that Ghana should be alive to the dangers of Communism and the importance of maintaining its independence. President Tubman said that he agreed and that he would try to find a way of paying an early visit to Accra. He mentioned, in this connection, that he was disturbed by Nkrumah's decision to retain the portfolios both of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior, which smacked to him of a dictatorship.

The Vice President then asked President Tubman how he foresaw the evolution of dependent peoples of West Africa and whether he had any advice for the United States. President Tubman said that there could be no doubt that the dependent people had a right to their own independence. However, he thought that they should be conscious of the advantages which their ties with Britain and France gave them in terms of developing their economies. He said that they had an enormous advantage over Liberia in this respect, since Liberia virtually had to start from scratch and, although there had been some United States assistance in recent years, has had to do everything for itself. With respect to United States attitudes, he had nothing specific to suggest except that we might find it in our interest to extend some economic assistance at Ghana in due course.

There followed a short discussion on the role of private enterprise in developing Liberia, during the course of which President Tubman indicated his awareness of the importance of this factor in the evolution of the country. He mentioned that he was concerned at the number of irresponsible investors who are anxious to obtain a foothold in Liberia and said that he was particularly suspicious of the Germans in this respect. He said he could not forget that during the Hitler regime, Britain and France had suggested that the Germans might find satisfaction of their colonial ambitions in Liberia. He said that he was thinking of introducing new legislation which would require potential investors in Liberia to put up a deposit which would be forfeited in the event that no agreement were reached with respect to concessionary arrangements. He thought that this would serve as a deterrent to irresponsible investors.

Note: On March 9, President Tubman informed Vice President Nixon that he had had a reply from Nkrumah in response to the personal message which he had sent him through Vice President Tolbert upon the occasion

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of Ghana's independence. In his reply, Nkrumah had indicated that he was appreciative of President Tubman's message, that he intended to follow the President's leadership on matters of policy, including that towards Communism, and that he had felt great revulsion at the events in Hungary and did not want the same thing to happen to Ghana.

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STATE-~~FD~~-WASH., D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

American Embassy
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS:

Ethiopian: H.E. Bitwoddet Makonnen Endalkatchew, Prime Minister of Ethiopia
H.E. Lidj Endalkatchew Makonnen, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs

American: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States.
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Mr. Joseph Simonson, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia

The Prime Minister welcomed the Vice President and said that he was delighted that the latter had found it possible to make this visit to Ethiopia. He spoke of the close relations which have existed for so long between the two countries and the respect with which the United States is viewed in Ethiopia as the result of its refusal to recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. He added that, speaking in complete frankness, there has been a feeling recently in Ethiopia that the United States is not doing as much as it should in assisting that country and recalled, in this connection the support which Ethiopia has given the United States in the UN, the Korean war, the Suez controversy, etc. He said that His Imperial Majesty and other members of the Ethiopian Government would be going into these matters in more detail but that he wished to make the general point. He observed that there is an old Ethiopian saying that the best way to be strong is to strengthen one's friends.

The Vice President emphasized the importance which the United States attaches to its relations with Ethiopia. He said that the United States Government understands and appreciates the support which Ethiopia has given the cause of freedom on various important international problems. He said that he would listen with attention and report to the President on any matters of outstanding difference between the two countries.

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State-FD, Wash, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

American Embassy
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
March 12, 1970

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS:

Ethiopian: His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia
H.E. Tsahafe Tezaz Tafarra Worq Kidane Wolde, Private Secretary to HIM

American: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States.
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Mr. Joseph Simonson, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia

After welcoming the Vice President and expressing pleasure that he had found it possible to visit Ethiopia at this time, the Emperor said that he would like to talk in a spirit of great frankness about the current state of U.S.-Ethiopian relations. He then spoke along the lines of the attached summary of remarks, which was subsequently provided by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In replying to His Imperial Majesty, the Vice President emphasized the importance which the United States attaches to the maintenance of close relations with Ethiopia. He said that we understand and appreciate the support which Ethiopia has given to the cause of freedom. In the light of these factors, we are most anxious to remove any causes of misunderstanding which exist between the two countries.

Replying to the specific points raised by His Imperial Majesty, the Vice President spoke as follows:

1. He would report to the President the Emperor's feeling of disappointment on the question of military aid. He added that he had recently received information which indicated that the rate of deliveries of MDAP equipment had been slow and that he would look into this situation upon his return. He pointed out, in connection with Ethiopian concern about the continuity of programs, that the Executive Branch of the Government is dependent upon annual appropriations from the Congress, which makes difficult any long-range commitment.

2. With respect to the Emperor's criticism that the rate of interest

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by the Export-Import Bank was no more favorable than that available commercially, the Vice President pointed out that unfortunately we are now in a period of rising interest rates. Moreover, Exim bank interest rates are fixed by law.

3. With respect to the development of the Nile, the Vice President reiterated the views he had expressed in his press conference at Entebbe to the effect that in his view Nile development should be approached co-operatively by the various riparian states, i.e., Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and the U.K. on behalf of Uganda.

In summing up, the Vice President said that he would draw to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State His Imperial Majesty's concern on the various matters discussed and would interest himself personally in facilitating a solution to them.

The Vice President then asked the Emperor what he conceived to be Ethiopia's most important developmental needs. The Emperor spoke of the problem caused by unemployment within the country. He said that he would like to utilize United States economic aid to help correct this situation. The highest priority items were communications (particularly roads), public health and education. He placed particular emphasis on roads, pointing out that these were necessary to open up the more inaccessible parts of the country for development.

The conversation then returned to the question of Nile development. The Emperor reviewed the history of Ethiopia's relationship with Great Britain on this subject, including the agreement which was negotiated between the U.K. and Ethiopia about fifty years ago whereby Ethiopia undertook in return for a promised payment of 10,000 pounds a year not to divert the waters of the Blue Nile. This payment has never been made by the British and consequently the agreement is no longer in effect. Ethiopia feels that in its own interests it should start to develop the Lake Tana and Blue Nile areas. He hoped the United States would consider this matter carefully.

In concluding, the Emperor reiterated the spirit of frankness and friendliness which had motivated him in raising these matters. The Vice President said that he greatly appreciated this frankness and that he would not fail to follow these matters up when he returned to Washington.

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State-ED, Wash., D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS:

Ethiopian: H.E. Ato Aklilou Abte Wolde, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia
H.E. Lidj Endalkatchew Makonnen, Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs

American: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the
United States.
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs
Mr. Joseph Simonson, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia

After welcoming the Vice President, Ato Aklilou said that he was familiar with the presentation which the Emperor had made. There were certain points which he wished to elaborate.

Aklilou said that he wished first of all to emphasize the growing importance of Africa. A number of new states had recently emerged and additional ones were in course of evolution toward self-government or independence. This is a development which Ethiopia has welcomed and to which it has lent its support. He spoke of Ethiopia as being both a Middle Eastern and African nation, which enhances its importance to the United States. It is, he said, the only non-NATO state in the Middle East which gave active support to the UN action in Korea. It had, moreover, given valuable support to the United States and the free world on many matters within and without the UN. In taking this position, it had often been criticized by other members of the Afro-Asian bloc as being too pro-Western. It has been willing to incur this criticism because of the considerations of principle which bind it to the United States, but it cannot ignore the fact that this position has increased its vulnerability to retaliation by the Afro-Asian bloc.

This brought Ato Aklilou to the second major point which he wished to make and which related to the problem of Greater Somaliland. He traced the history of this question, pointing out that it had originally been sponsored by the British and that even now influential colonial circles in the U.K. are pressing for a union of the Somalilands which would result in a detachment of a large portion of Ethiopian territory. He said that Ethiopia had been both surprised and disappointed at the position which the United States had taken this year at

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the General Assembly on the Somali border problem, where we had taken a position opposed to that of Ethiopia during the first few days of the debate, had failed to speak up in support of Ethiopia's position during the course of the debate, and had only supported Ethiopia when it came down to the final vote. He contrasted this with the position of the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs, which had given effective support to Ethiopia.

On the future of the border negotiations, Aklilou expressed his conviction that the matter could easily be settled once Somalia has its independence. Ethiopia would be happy to federate with Somalia as with Eritrea if that were the wishes of the Somalis, but is equally prepared to accept Somali independence. However they could not accept a foreign-dominated Somalia.

Ato Aklilou then went on to express Ethiopia's concern at the activities of Egypt in attempting to stir up Ethiopia's Moslem population and bring about a dismemberment of the Empire. This also appeared to be the aim of British policy in the area. He said that at the time of Mr. Douglas Dodd-Parker's visit here last year, the British had been quite frank in asking Ethiopia to give up parts of its territory to enhance the viability of a united Somaliland. Ethiopia had flatly refused to consider such a proposal.

Ato Aklilou said that he raised these matters in order to indicate that whereas Ethiopia wished to cooperate with the United States, it must nevertheless take effective steps to secure its own interests. It has looked to the United States for assistance in doing this, but the American response has been disappointing.

The Vice President expressed his appreciation for the frankness with which Ato Aklilou had set forth his concern. He repeated what he had told the Emperor, i.e., that he would report the Ethiopian views to the President and to the Secretary of State with a view toward seeing what action could be taken by the two countries to correct the misunderstandings which had arisen. He asked Mr. Palmer if he would like to comment on the questions which had been raised in connection with the Greater Somaliland problem.

Mr. Palmer said that he would like to make clear that United States has never lent its support to any project for a Greater Somaliland which would result in the detachment of Ethiopian territory. He added that, in the spirit of Ato Aklilou's conversations last year in London with Mr. Dulles, that he (Mr. Palmer) had about two months ago talked to the Foreign Office in London when he was there for conversations on other subjects. He said that the Foreign Office had assured him at that time that although in 1946 it had been British policy to seek a Greater Somaliland which would include the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia, this is no

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longer official British policy. He had been informed at that time that the British would probably have no objection to a union of Somalia and British Somaliland if that were the desire of the inhabitants, but that the British Government would not support any move to detach Ethiopian territory. Mr. Palmer suggested that it might be useful if he had a further conversation with Ato Aklilou when he had more time in order to explain the United States position on the Somaliland border problem, since the United States had certainly never envisaged taking a position which was contrary to Ethiopia's best interests.

In closing, the Vice President reiterated the importance which the United States attaches to its relationship with Ethiopia, his intention to report to the President and his conviction that any current misunderstandings could be ironed out in the continued interest of both countries.

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State-FD, Wash., D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS:

Ethiopian: H.E. Ras Abebe Arogay, Minister of Defense
Lidj Endalkatchew Makonnen, Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs

American: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the
United States.
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs
Mr. Joseph Simonson, U S. Ambassador to Ethiopia

The Minister of Defense said that he was delighted to have this opportunity to talk to the Vice President. The major problems involving military aid had already been raised by the Emperor and he would not elaborate further except to emphasize the importance of this matter to Ethiopia. He said that there were two other related questions which he wished to mention. The first relates to the fact that much of the equipment which Ethiopia is receiving is second-hand and therefore of lessened utility. The second problem relates to the difficulty which Ethiopia has encountered in obtaining data on the value of items delivered. This makes it almost impossible for Ethiopia to know at any given point just how much actually has been received in the way of assistance.

The Vice President repeated what he had already told the Emperor and the Foreign Minister about his intention to report to the President and to look into the question of military assistance. He added that he knew that deliveries had at times been slow and that he would also look into this matter as well as the two additional points which the Defense Minister had raised.

The Vice President then asked the Defense Minister whether he felt his present force -- including the Police -- is sufficient to insure the internal security of Ethiopia. The Defense Minister replied that he thought that under present circumstances the security forces are strong enough to meet any likely situation. He pointed out, however, that we are living in dynamic times and that many ideologies and subversive forces are at work which might change the situation at any time. It is therefore most important that Ethiopia have at her disposal the capability to counter these forces both internally within Ethiopia and externally in the cause of collective security.

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State-FD, Wash., D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS:

Ethiopian: H.E. Ato Aklilou Abte Wold, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia
Mr. John Spencer, American Advisor to Ethiopian
Government

American: Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs

Mr. Palmer said that he would like to clarify the position which the United States had taken in the General Assembly this year with respect to the Somali border problem. He said that our analysis of the situation was as follows:

Nationalism is rapidly growing in Somalia and the demands for a Greater Somaliland can be expected to increase. As the Foreign Minister knew, the United States has always opposed the detachment of any Ethiopian territory and this continues to be our position. We believe, however, Somalia can be expected to pursue its ambitions for a Greater Somaliland, including the Ogaden province of Ethiopia. We feel that under these circumstances it would be in Ethiopia's own interest to make every effort to find a means of settling the border problem before Somalia attains its independence. Otherwise, the unsettled border may prove a great temptation to Somali nationalism to pursue that part of its five-point program which calls for the detachment of the Ogaden province from Ethiopia. On the other hand, a settlement of this problem while the United Nations still maintains an interest in the Trust Territory would imply a UN blessing to the border arrangement and thereby place Ethiopia in the best possible position in the event an independent Somali attempted to violate Ethiopian territory. We had also taken into account the fact that efforts at negotiations for the past several years have proven unsuccessful. We therefore believed that the introduction of a new element, such as mediation, arbitration or some similar device might be necessary in order to facilitate agreement. We had, therefore, authorized our delegation in New York to explore this possibility with the Ethiopians, the Italians, and other delegations to see whether a basis existed for some such impartial determination of the boundary problem. When we found that there was considerable support for one further effort at negotiations before resorting to a device of this kind, we supported the resolution

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which had been introduced to that effect. It is therefore clear that the U.S. had no thought of taking a position opposed to Ethiopia's interests but had regarded the explorations which it had undertaken as having been in the best interests of that country.

Aklilou thanked Mr. Palmer for his explanation of this problem which he said he understood. He went on to recount the history of the border problem and of the efforts to solve it by direct negotiation. He said that Ethiopia also was anxious to settle the matter before Somalia attains its independence but did not at all despair of doing so after independence if this became necessary. He said that Ethiopia must, in its own interest, stand on the 1908 Treaty and could not agree to any procedure whereby "hundreds of international secretariat people" would come into the area. Any solution to the boundary problem should be based on juridical considerations and not on ascertaining facts on the spot.

Mr. Palmer said that it was his understanding that the U.S. had always accepted the fact that the primary point of departure in any impartial mediatory or arbitration procedure would be the 1908 Convention and that the primary problem would be to interpret that Convention. He did not think that this principle should be applied rigidly; there might be an adjustment of the border which both sides could accept to their mutual advantage and he did not think this could be ruled out. He said he thought that it would be highly desirable if, in the event no progress is reached in negotiations during the course of the next year, the Ethiopian delegation to the UN could sit down with the interested Departmental officers in Washington prior to the opening of the General Assembly and have an exchange of views on this subject in order to insure as close an identity of views as possible and obviate any misunderstandings during the course of the next General Assembly. Aklilou expressed agreement with this suggestion.

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State-FD, Wash., D.C.

SUMMARY OF THE REMARKS MADE BY HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY
AT THE AUDIENCE GRANTED ON MARCH 12, 1957 TO HIS
EXCELLENCY THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. His Imperial Majesty expressed great pleasure at the visit of the Vice President with whom, as a personal friend, He could discuss Ethiopian-American relations in complete frankness and without fear of misunderstanding.
2. He observed that Ethiopia is at the same time, an integral part of both Africa and of the Middle East, as is evidenced by the importance of Ethiopia in the question of the Nile waters, over three-fourths of which have their origins in that country, by the role played by Ethiopia in and out of the United Nations in the problem of fostering the independence of African territories, and in the Suez question where, in the international conferences and in the Five Power Committee, Ethiopia represented the entire African continent.
3. In view of the significance of Ethiopia both in Africa and in the Middle East, the question of Ethiopian-American collaboration becomes particularly important. It was His Imperial Majesty's sincere hope that His visit to the United States three years ago might lay the basis for a solid and close collaboration between the two countries and Governments. However, the period that has followed has not borne out those hopes.
4. For her part, Ethiopia, under the personal direction of His Imperial Majesty has sought both in the political and in the military fields, to lay the basis for such a lasting collaboration. In political matters, Ethiopia, in cooperating with the United States, has run counter to the policies of the other States of the Middle East in sending troops to Korea ---and in refusing to recognize Communist China. She has incurred severe criticism from her Middle Eastern friends for supporting American policies in these matters. In addition, in response to a direct appeal from the U.S. Ethiopia gave---and with considerable courage, in view of sharp opposition from her neighbor, Egypt---the support requested for the U.S. program for the Canal, even to the extent of participating in the Five Power Commission.
5. Likewise, in the military field, His Imperial Majesty personally gave orders to grant the U.S. requests for military facilities in Ethiopia although they far exceeded the original demands, have since been greatly augmented when it came to implementing the agreement, and have now been increased by yet further demands. Not only base installations, but also certain privileges over the entire territory of Ethiopia, have been accorded, quite unlike those in any other country in the Middle East. Also, at the time of His Imperial Majesty's visit to the President, He offered additional privileges as compensation for a broader basis of collaboration between the two countries.

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6. However, that cooperation has apparently failed to materialize in any significant measure during the years. At the time of His visit, His Imperial Majesty had discussed with President Eisenhower the fields in which greater collaboration might be achieved, such as defense, ports, highways, aviation, social services, etc. The President personally assured His Imperial Majesty of his own direct and personal interest in seeing that more be accomplished than in the past with Ethiopia, and to that end, designated certain high officials of the U.S. Government for discussing these matters fully with the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia. Detailed discussions were had and His Imperial Majesty even delayed His departure from the States in order to bring about some measure of success in the negotiations. Moreover, His Imperial Majesty has personally intervened on many subsequent occasions, both with His Excellency the American Ambassador and with high U.S. officials on official mission to Ethiopia in order to achieve some tangible basis of collaboration. However, the subsequent period has revealed but few elements of progress.

7. His Imperial Majesty pointed out by way of example, the program of assistance in social and economic fields. The Technical Assistance Program has been extended to all countries of Africa and the Middle East, yet the program for Ethiopia has been on a minimum basis, moreover, indeed, far less than many countries who are less favorably disposed towards American policies. The recently published report of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, indicates that this minimal program may now be further restricted. His Imperial Majesty remarked that, following conversations in London between Secretary of State Dulles and the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, there had been talk of additional funds, but that that talk had been surrounded with so many retractions and contradictions and, indeed, conditions that acceptance of such assistance would have been difficult. He expressed the hope that, following the understandings reached between the Ethiopian Government and the Chief of the International Cooperation Administration, new difficulties might be avoided. Reference was also made to loan assistance from the Export-Import Bank. That assistance is deeply appreciated, but some further measure of support is necessary. In this connection, it was noted that, other Middle Eastern and African States appear to qualify for greater loan assistance, although their political and financial stability remains to be demonstrated.

8. As regards military assistance, His Imperial Majesty pointed to the very large area of Ethiopia, its long borders both in Africa and on the Red Sea and, in particular, to the crucial problem with which she is faced with the studied campaign pursued by hostile interests in the Middle East and in Europe for the dismemberment of Ethiopia in favor of a so-called Greater Somaliland. The extent of this terrible threat had been fully set out to Secretary of State Dulles by the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia during the recent London Conferences. Ethiopia cannot possibly remain

passive

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passive in the face of this threat. A program of armament is essential. In this connection, His Imperial Majesty remarked that outside of India, nowhere in the Middle East will be found the long traditions of standing armies and military missions that will be found in Ethiopia. The other territories have all been under colonial regimes until recent years, whereas Ethiopian forces have always fought with great distinction for preserving national independence.

9. However, notwithstanding the extreme urgency of these needs for military equipment, the response from the United States has been rather discouraging. No progress whatever was made until the moment when the United States asked for sweeping privileges in Ethiopia; privileges granted under conditions more favorable than anywhere else in the Middle East; yet once the base privileges were obtained and after an initial agreement for military assistance was reached, far from being maintained at the first year's level, the military assistance was reduced to one-tenth that amount and today, in the fifth year of a program is still on a purely year to year basis --- although U.S. privileges in Ethiopia have been granted for an extremely long period as compared with other areas in the Middle East, arms to the value of less than \$8,000,000 have been actually delivered. Although the assistance from the United States has been slow in forthcoming, Ethiopia, on the contrary, is now asked to agree to additional privileges on a long-term basis, although she is still without the means for defending these installations. Moreover, these demands raise considerable political problems for Ethiopia. For example, His Imperial Majesty referred to the very recent objection by Egypt to the presence of American naval units in the Red Sea. If Ethiopia is to give privileges to the U.S. Fleet at Massawa, serious political repercussions may be expected at this time, both as regards other countries in the Middle East and public opinion in Ethiopia itself.

10. With this reference to political problems, His Imperial Majesty also remarked that in other fields, essential collaboration has been lacking. For example, although Ethiopia alone supplies more than three-fourths of the waters of the Nile, at the crucial point of discussions of this matter, His Imperial Majesty was not consulted by the United States. When, finally, the United States recognized the exceptional importance of the Ethiopian contribution to the problem, His Imperial Majesty was constrained to point out that, in contributing 85% of the waters of the Nile, Ethiopia must first reserve all necessary quantities for her own rapidly expanding needs in agriculture and industry, and that some financial assistance will be required for the completion of hydro-electric and other barrages to meet these needs.

11. Similarly, although recently in London, Secretary of State Dulles had promised full collaboration with Ethiopia in the questions concerning the British in Somaliland and the frontier problem with the Trust

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Territory of Somaliland, only a few days ago, on the very day of voting at the United Nations on the question of the frontier, the American Delegation informed the Ethiopian Delegation, contrary to those promises, that it was intending to introduce a resolution proposing precisely the solution to which Ethiopia was particularly opposed. It was only after massive support for the Ethiopian position by all the Middle Eastern and other States, friends of Ethiopia, and indeed, by the Soviet Bloc which took the floor to defend the Ethiopian position, that the U.S., which had never in fact, spoken in favor of the final Resolution, voted for it along with the others.

12. His Imperial Majesty observed that all of these considerations point clearly to the necessity of a profound re-examination of relations between the two countries. His Imperial Majesty's personal policies and conviction are that close collaboration with the United States is not only of the utmost importance, but is entirely possible on the basis of a fresh and frank approach to the problems. It is in this sense that, relying on friendship with the Vice President, He has set out these problems in complete frankness and in the hope and conviction that the Vice President will, upon return to the United States, exert all his personal prestige to the achievement of this important objective.

Addis Ababa

12th of March 1957.

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State-FD, Wash., D.C.

DEFENSE PROBLEMS OF ETHIOPIA

In 1947, the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia initiated, in Washington, discussions with the Government of the United States of America for the sending to Ethiopia, of a United States military training Mission, to replace the British Military Mission withdrawn, for reasons of economy, by the British Government, after the Second World War, and for arms assistance. Those discussions were pursued continuously thereafter, in consequence of which in 1951, the then Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bolte, made a special trip to Ethiopia for the purpose of studying the problem at first hand. Since that time, numerous other military officials of the United States have visited Ethiopia for the same purpose, including Generals Van Fleet and Trudeau, and later General Cook. In June of 1952, there were exchanged between the two governments, notes concerning the defense needs of Ethiopia, including organizational and training matters. In December of that year, negotiations had progressed to the stage where specific proposals for a training mission, were advanced by the Government of the United States of America, proposals which, subsequently, led to the provisions of Article IV-3 of the Mutual Defense Agreement of May 22, 1953, hereinafter referred to. On April 21, 1953, the United States Combined Chiefs of Staff, and on May 12, 1953, the President of the United States of America, determined that the defense of Ethiopia is a matter of strategic importance to the United States of America and to the free world, justifying and requiring grand aid military assistance (Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951) and the sending to Ethiopia of a Military Mission. Ten days later, May 22, 1953, there were signed in Washington, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the acting Secretary of State of the United States, two military agreements, the one, entitled, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and the other an Agreement concerning the utilization of defense installations within the Empire of Ethiopia. The first of these agreements provides for arms assistance and a training mission. The second provides for general privileges for United States Forces in Ethiopia, including freedom of entry, transit, manoeuvring, inspection, surveying, and particularly, the right to install, use and enlarge defense installations within Ethiopia and along the coast. Since the signing of the latter agreement, the original requests of the United States Government have been considerably expanded. Those requests have have all been granted.

From the foregoing, it should be apparent that, the conclusion of the agreement of May 22, 1953, after six years of active discussions, represented a careful assessment of the strategic situation and importance of Ethiopia, in the light of the then existing circumstances. It might be relevant, therefore, to recall, in four sentences, those circumstances existing as of May, 1953. At that time, Ethiopia was actively participating in the Korean War at the side of the United States of America and was the only non-NATO State in the Middle East to do so.

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Also, a few months previously, Ethiopia reacquired 700 miles of coastline on the Red Sea, including the Ports of Massawa and Assab, and the Dahlac Archipelago and other islands from which the southern half of that strategic body of water could be completely controlled, as well as the territory of Eritrea in which the United States was interested in maintaining military installations and in acquiring additional rights and privileges. Finally, also but a few months earlier, the United States, together with another NATO Power, was engaged in establishing the Northern Tier concept for the defense of the Middle East. At that time, the utility of the territories to the rear of the Northern Tier, as staging areas and regions for building up military and troop reserves, and the importance of preventing those same areas and regions from falling under the influence of hostile Powers, were also weighed and discussed in the course of the negotiations.

From the time of signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1953 and until the fiscal year 1955-1956, the United States of America have supported Ethiopia in the following way:---

1952--1953	5,000,000 U.S. \$
1953--1954	500,000 U.S. \$
1954--1955	5,000,000 U.S. \$
	372,000 U.S. \$ Army
1955--1956	1,696,000 U.S. \$ Navy

Total \$12,568,000 U.S. \$

The United States aid has included the following items:---

Army material	9,600,000 U.S. \$
Army training	1,272,000 U.S. \$
Navy aid	1,696,000 U.S. \$

The figures mentioned above give, however, not the true picture showing the support according to the approved program. Army equipment actually received by Ethiopia amounts to a value of not more than 7,925,000 U.S.\$; the Navy aid includes one large patrol-craft, spare parts and other expenses for the vessel, that will be delivered in early 1957. In this connection it must be pointed out that although the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Armed Forces has several times asked for information as to the prices of the equipment delivered, no accurate information has been given, making it difficult to get a clear picture of the real value of the United States support.

The Imperial Ethiopian Government has now been informed that for the year 1956-1957, only 4,600,000 U.S.\$ are allocated for armament

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although additional financial assistance is afforded through the promised funding by the Government of the United States, of the accessorial costs for MDAP equipment shipped to Ethiopia from sources outside the United States (MAAG, 000, 18 October, 1956, Confidential Memorandum of Chief MAAG-Ethiopia, to His Excellency the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Armed Forces). In addition 400,000 U.S.\$ are allocated for training of Ethiopian Officers in the United States.

In consequence Ethiopia has been allocated only 17,168,000 U.S.\$ during the period following the agreement and of this, equipment of a value of but 7,925,000 U.S.\$ has, actually, been received in Ethiopia. Had the original figure been kept to, Ethiopia would have been allocated a total of 25,000,000 U.S.\$ in arms assistance. Hence the Imperial Government is not satisfied with the way in which the Mutual Defense Agreement has developed as far as allocation of money for armament is concerned.

As regards the received equipment, most of this equipment has been previously used and, upon arrival, has been determined to be serviceable, only after extensive repairs. Spare parts have been forthcoming, but, in many instances, have proved to be unutilizable for rendering serviceable the equipment received. For example, transport vehicles received, have been difficult to maintain, and the repairing and servicing of the same with spare parts, generally impossible, cannibalization being often the only resource. In addition, maintenance has proved to be very costly. They are, furthermore, so old and inefficient that the quantities of carburant consumed, surpass all reasonable requirements. As another instance, might be cited the small arms. On the occasion of the Jubilee Celebrations of His Imperial Majesty a quantity sufficient to equip not even one division had been delivered, unfortunately the rifles were incomplete. The troops were, therefore, compelled to parade with old Czechoslovak rifles. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the ammunition so far supplied under the Agreement had been previously used and recharged before shipment to Ethiopia, or was outdated, with the result that, with such supplies, it has been practically impossible to build up stocks of any importance. In this situation, an increase in the output of the munitions factory in Addis Ababa becomes a necessity. We requested that aid in retooling and procurement of raw materials be given to our ammunition factory instead of the unreliable ammunition, and consequently, in 1956, a special U.S. Military Mission spent one week inspecting the factory. That mission confirmed its usefulness and recommended retooling of the same. However, to date, nothing has eventuated from that recommendation and no answers have been forthcoming to inquiries by the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Forces in this matter.

Objection

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Objection has been made that, lack of proper training on the part of Officers and troops, greatly limits the capacity of the Armed Forces, to absorb the equipment which might otherwise be supplied. However, it will be recalled that the programs of supplies have been carefully limited, for the most part, to the simple and light equipment well within the capacity of the troops. The heavier armament has been greatly limited in amounts. At present plans are underway in order to improve the training of personnel and the storing, of equipment. If, however, for the future any difficulties as regards training or storing, hampering Ethiopia to absorb the equipment, should appear, these difficulties should be removed by increased United States support in this respect.

As regards training, it might be remarked that the negotiations during the period December, 1952--May, 1953, were, in the first instance primarily concerned with the furnishing of a training mission to replace the British Military Mission to Ethiopia, withdrawn under the circumstances above-indicated and that they had, as of the end of the year 1952, progressed to the point of written proposals from the United States Government. Paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Agreement reflects the discussion on this subject. Subsequently, in 1954, the Chief MAAG-Ethiopia formally informed His Imperial Majesty that MAAG would train personnel and assist in any way the Ethiopian Government desired, including the foundation at Harrar, of a military academy. In consequence, plans for two other institutes at Holetta, and Addis Ababa were suspended pending the execution of the undertaking of the MAAG. Further recommendations in this same sense were made, the following year, by His Excellency the American Ambassador. However, four months later, the entire policy was reversed and the promise of the MAAG Chief declared, 21 months later, to have been "completely unauthorized". Serious delays have, consequently, been entailed. During the past four years 1,272,000 U.S.\$, i.e., about 10% of the total support, have been spent on training of Ethiopian Officers in the United States. On the other hand, the arms allotment of \$5,000,000 for the year 1956-57, has been reduced in the amount of \$400,000 in order to provide for such a training. While the Imperial Ethiopian Government desires to express its appreciation of the aid accorded in this field, experience has demonstrated that this type of training may not, for a variety of reasons, be useful for Ethiopia. Problems of standards and indoctrination arise, in this connection. However, the principal objection, as revealed by past experience, is that the frequent and unfortunate experiences of the Ethiopian Officers with segregation in the United States, have been such that the program is far from serving its designed purpose of fostering closer and more friendly relations as well as improving the technical standards of the Ethiopian Army.

Since the entry into force of the two agreements signed on May 22, 1953, the Imperial Ethiopian Government has always complied with the

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numerous requests of the Government of the United States of America for expanding the United States Base at Asmara, incidentally, much beyond the limits indicated in the exchange of notes appended to the Defense Installations Agreement. On the other hand, its efforts to obtain a greater measure of implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, indeed, even, to bring the annual figure back to the amount provided for the initial year, have proved to be, in a great measure, unavailing, notwithstanding the directives of the President of the United States following his conversation with His Imperial Majesty during the latter's visit to the United States in 1954, and notwithstanding repeated discussions in Washington by His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1954 and 1955, and, by him and others in Addis Ababa, not only with His Excellency the American Ambassador, but also with Generals Trudeau, Van Fleet, Cook and others. Although requests have covered the following fields, the situation today, is as follows:---

Common for the Armed Forces:--

No adequate maps are available: there are no anti-aircraft defense in existence.

The Army:--

Although the Army now planned to be organized on four commands and the services as soon as possible, small arms including machine-guns and recoilless weapons are short and cannot even equip six (6) Brigades. Support by 81 mm resp 4.2 inch mortars cannot be given in a sufficient way. The transportation is quite insufficient and could not even provide the needs for training. There are only equipment for two (2) artillery battalions; no modern tanks are available and the anti-tank weapons are quite insufficient, nor is there any engineering equipment delivered. Ammunition is very sparse covering the need as regards mortars only for 1/2 - 1 week and as regards artillery only for 2 - 3 weeks. No medical equipment is available; there is no bridging equipment available; not a single fortification; no mines have as yet been delivered.

1.) Light Division:--

The Air Force:--

The Air Force is equipped only with 58 unmodern aircrafts; not a single modern bomber or fighter unit is available.

The Coast Guard:--

The Coast Guard

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The Coast Guard has not yet received its training ship; there is lack of training equipment; no mines or mine-sweeping equipment is available, not a single coastal defense installation.

The above enumeration is submitted solely for the purpose of setting out the magnitude of the problem on the national defense of Ethiopia and the degree to which it has been possible or impossible to meet that problem through Ethiopia's own efforts and from outside assistance. It is to that question, that the present memorandum will, now be addressed.

It is conceivable that this state of almost utter destitution of armed forces, would in theory, be no cause for concern for a small isolated country surrounded by friendly neighbours. Such, is most certainly, not the case with Ethiopia, either in the past, today, or especially, in the immediate future.

Ethiopia has an area equal to the combined areas of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Yemen. It is as large as the entire Northwest of the United States, (California, Oregon, Washington and Idaho) and has the same population as that of those states. It has, approximately, the same area and population as Egypt, with this difference that the inhabitable area of Egypt (15,400 square miles) is but one fifteenth the inhabitable area of Ethiopia. The latter has nearly five thousand miles of frontier to defend, bordering on five different territories, and a seacoast of 700 miles on one of the most important and strategic bodies of water on the globe.

Furthermore, she is not surrounded by peaceful neighbours. Indeed, her entire history, has been one constant struggle against the designs of foreign powers. It is an irony of fate that, but two decades after the aggression against her that led to the Second World War, she is, today again faced with a threat against her security and territorial integrity, in precisely the same region.

Indeed, the situation today is more disturbing than two decades ago. A studied and open campaign for the dismemberment of Ethiopia for the benefit of the Somaliland territories to the east and south, massed tribal attacks from the east and raids by foreign military planes over adjoining Ethiopian territory, as the American Embassy is aware, accompanied by an incessant propaganda from both territories calling for a Greater Somaliland within three years upon the termination of the trusteeship in former Italian Somaliland in 1960, bring the crisis daily closer with giant strides, and yet Ethiopia has not a single anti-aircraft unit, no anti-tank unit, no mines, no mine sweeping equipment, no fighter squadron, not even rifles for more than one division. A steady campaign of subversion within Ethiopia seeks the disaffection of the inhabitants of the territories which colonial interests openly

declare

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declare their intention to appropriate for the establishment of the so-called Greater Somaliland. The problem is not only one of defense against external aggression, but also, maintenance of internal security against deliberately subversive campaigns supported from nearby territories with funds and agents. Rarely, in her long history, has Ethiopia been faced by a crisis of such magnitude.

Unfortunately, this active campaign of subversion designed to further the establishment of a Greater Somaliland, forms but part of a larger and still more disturbing picture as regards the position of Ethiopia in the Middle East.

The agents who carry on, in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the subversive propaganda against the Imperial Ethiopian Government, are Moslems, and for the most part, at the same time, communist sympathisers. In seeking out the local leaders, their discourse is approximately as follows:---that Ethiopia in remaining faithful to the West is showing her unfaithfulness to the Arab world and, to Moslems in Ethiopia, in particular; that the attachment of the central government to the Western Colonial powers is evidence that that government does not have the interests of the Moslems at heart, but on the contrary, in working with the West, and in according base facilities to "the Americans", the central government is seeking to stultify the efforts of the population to achieve progress and a higher standard of living than the miserable existence which they now know; that if the Ethiopian Government had at heart the real interests of the Ethiopian populations including the Moslems, it would loyally join hands with the Arab and Middle Eastern States instead of seeking to run with the West; joined in brotherly solidarity with the Arab and other Middle Eastern States, Ethiopia would, like them, become strong in arms and the Moslems could live in peace in Ethiopia; however, so long as Ethiopia continues with the West the only salvation for the Moslem inhabitants of the Ogaden territory is to seek to unite in order to form in 1960, the great and independent state of Great Somaliland.

Such is the tenor of the propaganda in the interior of Ethiopia for the fostering of a Greater Somaliland. However, at Addis Ababa and elsewhere, foreign agents hold the following discourse. Ethiopia, is, by geography and tradition, a Middle Eastern State and, in working with the Western Colonial Powers, including the United States is proving her faithlessness to her geography, history and traditions and, giving aid to the Colonial Powers to suppress the attainment of freedom and independence of peoples in Africa and the Middle East. In thus working with the West, it is Ethiopia that is playing the stooge of the Colonial Powers, in sending her sons to die in Korea and in being the stalking horse for the imperialistic designs of those same Powers on freedom of national development, of which the two Suez Canal Conferences are but the most recent examples:---the Western Powers have no intention of

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supporting Ethiopia, their only aim is to utilize her to cover and further their own imperialistic designs - the proof, whereas the Communist Powers fully support with arms, the struggle of Middle Eastern peoples towards freedom and independence, the West has never intended seriously to support Ethiopia's defense efforts, on the contrary, the arms received by Ethiopia are pitiful in comparison with those being received elsewhere in the Middle East; that the United States wishes to utilize Ethiopian territory, for bases, but that she has refused to defend the territory or the bases and has sent no arms that would permit Ethiopia to defend them herself; if Ethiopia would consent to see the light and refuse to continue to act as a stooge of the West, the problem of Greater Somaliland could be immediately solved, and at the same time, the problem of national defense, thanks to the arms that the lovers of freedom and independence are ready to supply; Ethiopia would then regain stature and dignity in the Middle East, instead of being an object of derision.

The threat of a Greater Somaliland, the pressure of events and movements in the Middle East, and the paucity of military aid being received by Ethiopia at a time when arms are flowing in elsewhere, make a continuation of present policies extremely difficult.

Day by day the pressure becomes greater. The Suez crisis has profoundly marked public opinion in Ethiopia as elsewhere in the Middle East and the conviction reigns that whatever settlement may intervene will be one confirming Egypt's act of nationalization, and much greater control over the Canal, on the part of Egypt, than in the past. Ethiopia has cooperated with the West to the maximum extent that the situation would allow, by attending both London Conferences and accepting membership in the Five Power Menzies Commission. However, she has now reached the absolute limit of her ability to cooperate with the West, and has had to refrain, under present circumstances, from joining the Canal Users Association.

As was stated above, one of the considerations discussed at the time of concluding the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Ethiopia in 1953, was the utility of territories to the rear of the Western Power's Security system in the Middle East, as eventual staging areas and regions for building up military and troop reserves and the importance of preventing those same areas and regions from falling under the influence of hostile Powers. However, in the period that has ensued, the arms program to Ethiopia, has on the contrary, fallen off, while arms are being poured into the Middle East by hostile Powers. Recent events in the Middle East all confirm the view that, following the conclusion of the Agreement, it is the hostile Powers, rather than the Western group, that have consolidated their position to the rear of the Northern Tier. In any event, following the conclusion of the Agreement,

the military

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the military position of Ethiopia has definitely deteriorated. Her politically hostile neighbours are receiving arms in quantity, whereas there has been a definite falling off of arms assistance under the Mutual Security Agreement. The situation in the Middle East can no longer permit a continuation of such a policy.

It is realized that, with the important exception of the Greater Somaliland issue, the hostile propaganda directed today against Ethiopia in these matters, is not entirely unlike that being promoted elsewhere in the Middle East. However, Ethiopia's means for meeting this menace and justifying her policies, are, for the circumstances and reasons above-indicated, far less efficacious than elsewhere. For example, although Transjordan, a State having less than one-tenth the area and population of Ethiopia, received annually \$25,000,000 in military aid, that fact did not prevent similar propaganda from bearing fruit. With one-fifth the military assistance at her disposal, and with ten times the area and population to defend, as compared with Transjordan, the Imperial Ethiopian Government cannot but entertain the most serious misgivings for the future. On the other hand, Egypt, has been supplied by the U.S.S.R. during the last year with equipment for about U.S.\$450,000,000; Syria has got armaments from the U.S.S.R. for about U.S.\$60,000,000; Yemen has got equipment by the U.S.S.R. to a value of about U.S.\$7,500,000. The U.S.S.R. have also provided instructors and technicians. It should also be stressed that the arms deliveries as mentioned above, has as far as is known by the Imperial Government, been done without any demands for separate equivalent returns in the form of bases, etc.

His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia has, on the occasion of the two London Conferences concerning the Suez Canal, fully set out to the Secretary of State of the United States the dangers inherent for Ethiopia in the present situation and received the promise that the matter would receive his personal and direct attention.

Under these circumstances, it is of the very greatest importance that further progress be achieved during the present year if the Imperial Government is to be able to justify continuation with the 1954 Agreement.

As far as the Army is concerned, the main problem will be to provide it with the form of equipment - including the masterpieces of modern equipment - but covering the whole field in order to improve the fighting value of the Army. An Army organization of 100,000 men (including divisions) and the services is a main objective of the Government.

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In accordance with the program prepared with MAAG - Ethiopia, and transmitted to the United States Government the accompanying heavy support arrangements - and the other equipment - transportation, engineering, sanitation - for four commands and the services are urgently required.

It is most important that the medical service of the Army be supported. As far as military hospitals are concerned, assistance is required to provide certain surgical, laboratory and medical equipment.

First priority should, however, be reserved for the necessary mobile first-aid units and field ambulances and for air transportation of sick and wounded personnel. As far as mobile units are concerned the urgent need in this respect have been assessed as follows:---

For Headquarters, etc., at Addis Ababa	1 large and 13 small mobile units,
For I Command	1 large and 13 small mobile units,
For II Command	1 large and 13 small mobile units,
For III Command	1 large and 13 small mobile units,
For IV Command	1 large and 13 small mobile units.

It is considered that the larger units should be diesel-powered trucks with trailers and should include surgical theatre, X-ray and laboratory equipment, etc., the small units should be of the jeep or land rover type, capable of full mobility on rough roads or trails.

It is also considered that each Command and the Headquarters at Addis Ababa should be provided with each six large stretcher type ambulances capable of carrying at least twelve wounded each.

An appropriate ambulance aircraft and two ambulance helicopters would also be of the greatest value and usefulness in meeting special situations, including nascent epidemic conditions, etc.

The medical facilities should also be improved if the following equipment could be provided:---

700 stretchers,
350 first-aid bags,

65 brigade and battalion aid stations including first-aid kits.

Sufficient stores for ammunition, POL and equipment must be available.

Spare parts

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Spare parts for all kinds of equipment as well as workshops and garages has to be available.

In principle, new, rather than used equipment must be sent.

Instead of shipping recharged or outdated ammunitions for small arms with the resultant savings, retooling should be effected for and raw material furnished for the munitions factory in Addis Ababa.

As far as the training is concerned more instructors from the United States are needed..

The living-quarters of the ground forces have to be improved. The Imperial Ethiopian Government is most desirous of acquiring, whether under the MDAP or by long-term purchase, Quonset and Niessen huts for accommodating troops.

The result of the training of Ethiopian Officers in the United States has not been satisfactory from the Ethiopian point of view. The reasons are, amongst others:---ten percent (1,272,000 U.S.\$) of the funds for the military aid have been spent on this training. Yet have not more than seventy-five (75) Officers had the opportunity to attend the courses, whereof two-thirds have been of a duration of only six (6) months or less. The training is performed according to schemes based on the facilities during peace and war of a great power with almost unlimited resources. This is to some extent unsuitable to Officers of a country with modest or small facilities. Most non-Ethiopian Officers attending the courses have a solid basic training behind them. This is mostly not the case with the Ethiopian Officer, whereby they are not fully capable of assimilating the training. Therefore, it is urgently requested that the sum of \$400,000, earmarked in the allocation for 1956-1957, for training in the United States, be assigned to military training in Ethiopia.

THE AIR FORCE

Most urgent for the moment is to get the training activity on modern airplanes at the Attack Wing started. If help with material can be calculated with, and if same is to be started already this fiscal year, material needed for the above-mentioned training is at first hand wanted.

The following equipment is urgently needed, and should, if possible, be delivered this fiscal year or as soon as possible:---10 dual seater jet trainers, 1 Dakota C-47, 1 Cessna L-19A or Cessna EO-1 and 5 PBV Catalinas, should be delivered as soon as possible.

Above aircraft

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Above aircraft are presumed to be complete with regards equipment according to the way in which respective aircraft is to be used, supplied with instruments, flight equipment, sights, arrangements for guns and rocket shooting and bomb dropping. Spare parts, special tools and station equipment should further more be supplied, all for five years' service.

Materials for navigation and radio service - radiotransmitters and receivers - as well as material for met. service - wind vanes, barometers, etc., - should be delivered.

Vehicles for salvaging and rescue are urgently needed.

The photo equipment should be improved.

Equipment for storing of fuel should be provided as well as one oxygen and hydrogen plant.

Trailer-mounted motor driven water pumps are needed.

Runway lightening equipment including approach lights should be provided.

Individual rescue equipment - parachutes, Mae Wests, etc., - are needed.

Equipment for construction and maintenance of airfields and runways - excavators, dump-trucks, etc. -, should be provided.

Finally some educational equipment such as jet engine, mock-up, etc., is needed.

ALL details as regards the above-mentioned equipment are given in a "Memorandum regarding required material for Imperial Ethiopian Air Force", separately submitted.

THE NAVY

The present situation in the Imperial Coast Guard is that only training is carried out. The training was started for around forty (40) Officer Cadets on the 1st of October, 1955. Today there are under training fifty-eight (58) Officer Cadets and ninety (90) technicians. The plan is further to take in one-hundred (100) ratings for training. This has not, however, yet been done due to the lack of equipment.

The need of ships for the Coast Guard:---

The Imperial

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The Imperial Government has already been informed that one (1) escort vessel P.C. 1616 (classified submarine chaser) will be delivered in the spring of 1957 and one (1) patrol boat, similar to the Coast Guard cutter type W.P.B. It is considered that, if the training is intensified it will be possible for the Coast Guard to absorb in addition to the P.C. 1616 and one (1) patrol boat in 1958, two (2) more patrol boats and by the end of 1959, one (1) more patrol vessel and one (1) more escort vessel (P.C. submarine chaser). It will not be possible to man these ships entirely with Ethiopian personnel by that time. There will be a small nucleus of foreign personnel for the first couple of years.

Base requirements for the Coast Guard:---

When the floating equipment as mentioned above is being received it will be necessary to arrange base-facilities sufficient to cope with the maintenance and repairs, which will naturally come. The equipment necessary to arrange such maintenance work-shops, should be delivered according to the following:---

- A slipway for patrol boats and improvements of one at the present slipways to take the escort-vessels.
- Engine maintenance and machine workshop.
- Electrical and instrument workshop.
- Blacksmith and sheet-metal workshop.
- Pipe and pipe-fitting workshop.
- Welding and construction workshop.
- Carpenters workshop.
- Radio, sonar, radar and visual signals workshop.
- Navigation workshop.
- Ordnance and gunnery workshop.
- T.A.S. workshop.
- Degaussing station.
- Telecommunications.

The present workshops could be the nucleus for further expansion by introducing the equipment as required above.

For the supply there is need of stores of all kinds.

Telecommunications equipment, i.e., transmitters and receivers are needed for the operation of the ships.

Details as regards the above-mentioned equipment are given in various lists to be submitted separately.

Training of the Coast Guard:---

Training

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Training equipment for the initial training, should be provided and delivered as soon as possible in accordance to the various list of equipment to be submitted separately. Other types of equipment for more advanced training should be delivered later on. Training facilities should be given abroad for a number of specialists in branches like radar, engineering, sonar electrical, refrigeration, etc.

The Merchant Navy:---

It is extremely difficult to find shipping spaces to take the exports and imports of civilian as well as military equipment. In case the political situation in the Middle East deteriorates, it will be most necessary for Ethiopia to have shipping at her disposal to a limited extent. Two (2) ships of the American mothball fleet, "Liberty" ships or others should be modernized to be competitive (i.e., fitting of diesel engines) and put to the disposal of the Ethiopian Government.

One (1) coaster of about 1,000 D.W. should be supplied to the Ethiopian Government in 1960 (G.C.) to replace the present two (2) small coasters due for replacement and to serve as a transport ship for military equipment and troops along the coast which is without proper roads.

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Under the first two Chiefs of MAAG, the progress and development of the mutual defense assistance program in Ethiopia were to the satisfaction neither of the United States nor of the Ethiopian Governments. It is now hoped that, with the present Chief of Mission who enjoys the full confidence of the Imperial Ethiopian Government and the Chief of Staff and Officers of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, it will be possible to move forward actively in the development of the defense forces of Ethiopia, at a moment particularly crucial for her and for the Middle East generally.

Addis Ababa

31st of January, 1957

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IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

M E M O R A N D U M

During His Imperial Majesty's visit to the United States, programs of assistance were discussed by the two Heads of State and in detail with officials appointed by President Eisenhower. Those programs related to ports, highways, aviation, fishing, education, health and military assistance, etc. However, with the exception of some progress in the matter of education and an Export-Import Bank loan for aviation, it would be difficult to point to appreciable achievements in the other matters.

As an instance among others, mention might be made of the problem of port development. The United States Government observed at that time, that assistance in this field would involve political difficulties with the French, and, in consequence, proposed that port development be effected by the International Bank. The Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, was thereupon, obliged to take up the matter directly with Secretary of State Dulles. In consequence; in a memorandum of July 7th, 1954, the Department of State declared that the U.S. Government was prepared to support the Ethiopian Government to secure loans necessary either from public or private sources. On the following day, July 8th, the Foreign Minister sought clarification of the phrase "public sources" stating that if that phrase signified that the United States might be interpreted as refusing to grant loan assistance for port development, he had the heavy responsibility towards His Imperial Majesty of informing Him without delay. In such a situation, it was important for the point to be clearly stated to His Imperial Majesty at that time, rather than some three or four months later. In reply, the Assistant Secretary of State declared that the word "public" signified an agency of the U.S. Government. He added that he would not ask Ethiopia to go to the International Bank unless it was subsequently clearly seen that no other system would work. However, thereafter and throughout all subsequent discussions of the matter both with the American Ambassador in Addis Ababa and at Washington, the United States Government has, at all times, continually insisted that the International Bank, rather than the U.S. Government, undertake the financing. The result has been that the political factors which within the International Bank oppose such a loan have, as predicted in Washington at the time of His Imperial Majesty's visit, been brought to bear to stultify progress in the matter.

Financial

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Financial assistance for highway development was also declined.

Of special concern has been the lack of significant progress in the field of military assistance, and that, at a time when States of the Middle East some of whom are unfavourably disposed towards American policies, are arming at a rapid rate.

The question of national defense, involves, at the same time, strategic and political factors. As regards strategic problems, it will be recalled that Ethiopia has approximately the same population and a somewhat greater area than Egypt—vastly greater in terms of inhabitable land, is as large as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen combined, and has the same population and area as those of the combined states of California, Oregon, Washington and Idaho. She has 3000 miles of land borders to defend along five territories and 700 miles of coastline near the mouth of the Red Sea, with thousands of islands affording bases for complete control of all traffic passing through that strategic world channel of shipping and communications. In addition, Ethiopia, supplies 85% of the waters of the Nile and 100% of the waters of the Trust Territory of Somaliland. Moreover, she is now faced with a studied campaign pursued by certain colonial interests as well as by anti-Ethiopian elements in the Middle East, for her dismemberment. Ethiopia views this threat with the greatest possible concern.

Ethiopia stands in the most urgent need of arms and, of all the countries of the Middle East, is the one having the longest military traditions, in terms of armies, training and experience, the other regions having been, until recently, all colonial territories. Furthermore, the military assistance program has been the subject of detailed and repeated studies dating from the Mission of General Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff, in 1951, and from long discussions with officials of the U.S. Armed Forces in 1952, with General Hull and others at the Department of Defense, in 1953, and subsequently, with Generals Van Fleet, Trudeau, Lemnitzer, Cook, Decker, Eddleman, Admiral Quinn and others. In every case, detailed written reports have been submitted. Yet, once the Mutual Defense Agreement was signed and Base privileges for U.S. armed forces in Ethiopia obtained, the first year's level of military assistance was abandoned, dropping to one-tenth that amount, and even as of to-day, has not attained the first year level. Moreover, although United States privileges are on a long-term basis in Ethiopia, and requests for further expansion have been submitted, the program of military assistance from the U.S.A. is only on a year-to-year basis. To-day, after four years of existence of the Mutual Assistance Agreement, Ethiopia has received less than \$8,000,000 of arms and but \$12,500,000 have been allocated for all purposes, whereas within the space of one year only, Egypt has received arms to the extent of \$450,000,000, Syria (one-tenth the size and population of Ethiopia)

\$60,000,000,

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\$60,000,000, and Yemen \$7,500,000; all this, without mentioning the vast sums accorded Saudi Arabia for military assistance and base rentals. To-day, notwithstanding full collaboration by Ethiopia in the military field, and long and detailed discussions over the years with high military officials of the United States, Ethiopia still has insufficient M-1 rifles to equip more than one division; but 58 obsolete military aircraft of 8 different types, no anti-tank unit, no mines, no mine sweeping equipment, no bridging equipment, no anti-aircraft equipment, but two 81 mm mortars, no military maps, no coastal defenses and, as yet, not one naval unit. Finally, after a series of promises and retractions, the local military education program has come to an almost complete stop.

As explained above, the question of national defense involves, at the same time, strategic and political factors. In the face of the disappointing results achieved in the field of military collaboration, the strategic factors, depending as they do on geography, remain invariable and unchanging. However, these same circumstances necessarily require an adjustment of political factors, particularly in view of the fact that the greatest single military threat to Ethiopia is of political origin, namely the campaign for the dismemberment of Ethiopia. Here, notwithstanding assurances received last year from Secretary of State Dulles, the situation has been profoundly changed by the attitude of the United States. In this context, it is noted that only two weeks ago, at the United Nations, on the very day of the vote of the frontier question concerning the Trust Territory of Somaliland, the Delegation of the United States contemplated introducing an anti-Ethiopian resolution in this matter. It was only after massive support for Ethiopia by all the Middle Eastern and other friendly States, and, indeed, by the Soviet Bloc which took the floor to defend integrally the Ethiopian position, that the United States which in fact, never spoke in favour of the final resolution, eventually voted for it along with the others.

It is believed that the time has come for a thorough-going re-examination of Ethiopian-American relations in the light of the situation existing in the Middle East. His Imperial Majesty entertains the hope that the visit of Vice President Nixon will lead to a far-reaching and lasting consolidation of relations.

ADDIS ABABA
12th March, 1957.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200140014-8

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Khartoum, The Sudan
March 13, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS: Sudanese: His Excellency Abdullah Khalil, Prime
Minister of The Sudan
His Excellency Muhammed Ahmad Mahjub,
Foreign Minister of The Sudan

American: Vice President of the United States
Richard M. Nixon
Lowell C. Pinkerton, United States
Ambassador to The Sudan
Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs

The Vice President said that he was delighted to have this opportunity of visiting the Sudan in connection with his tour of Africa. He had heard a great deal about the important progress which was being made in this country and had been most anxious to see it at first hand. He added that it was his custom in trips of this kind to learn as much as he could about conditions in and policies of the countries which he visited in order to make a report to the President and to the Secretary of State.

The Prime Minister replied that he was similarly most happy to have this opportunity to exchange views with the Vice President. He said that the Sudan found itself in agreement with most of the policies of the United States. He added that he was happy to be able to speak in complete frankness. The Sudan has adopted the attitude that it has nothing to hide and is anxious to open up its policies and attitudes for all to see.

The conversations then ranged over a wide variety of subjects, which may be summarized as follows:

1. Economic Aid.

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The Foreign Minister said that the Sudan requires two types of economic development. The first relates to projects which are bankable and can therefore be financed either through private loans or by such agencies as the World Bank. He mentioned, illustratively, textile mills, papyrus processing plants, hydro-electric projects, et cetera. These types of projects present no problem, since the Sudan can plan for them as it is able and can pay for them out of its own resources. The second category relates to projects which bring no direct financial return but are necessary to the development of the country. The Sudan's primary needs in this category are the development of water resources and roads. With respect to water, it is essential to the future economy of the country that means be found of settling the nomadic tribes in more permanent locations and water is necessary to this process. Such permanent settlement of the nomads would permit the development of certain of the Sudan's resources. For example, the production and export of gum arabic could be doubled if the nomadic tribes in the areas of production could be persuaded to remain there and assist in gathering this product. He went on to say that roads are necessary to open up new areas and to get products to market. The Sudan is unabashed at requesting assistance for such projects as these, because it knows that such aid will strengthen the Sudanese economy and create conditions which may make it possible in the future for the Sudan to assist some other less fortunate economy. He went on to say that the Sudan is determined to preserve its independence and will not accept aid from any country under conditions which might prejudice that objective. The Government has given considerable thought to U.S. assistance and is convinced that American aid is given without strings and for the sole purpose of aiding the country concerned to develop its own resources for its own good. Discussions had been held with Mr. Hollister during his recent visit to the Sudan and the Government is hopeful that the United States understands Sudanese needs as a result of these conversations.

The Vice President confirmed the Foreign Minister's statement regarding the objectives of United States aid. He said that he would be happy to make clear in his press conference this evening that U.S. aid is given without conditions and for the purpose of building stability and preserving independence.

2. The Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Foreign Minister said that his Government is giving careful consideration to the Eisenhower Doctrine and is looking forward to hearing Ambassador Richards' further explanations with respect to it. (The Prime Minister intervened to indicate that in his opinion the Sudanese Government would certainly go along with the President's

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program, but the Foreign Minister reiterated that no decisions had been taken.)

The Foreign Minister went on to say that he personally felt that from an American point of view the President's program would have been better understood and accepted in the Middle East if it had been generalized with respect to the problem of aggression rather than directed solely at the Communist menace. The Prime Minister intervened at this point to say that he disagreed with the Foreign Minister. He pointed out that he and his Government have taken the firm decision to combat communism and that he thought it is better to be outspoken on such matters and to identify the real nature of the threat. The Foreign Minister said that he was speaking purely from the point of view of how the United States could most effectively present the President's program.

The Vice President explained that there are two main aspects of the President's program. The first is to extend an assurance to the countries of the Middle East against communist aggression. The second is to so strengthen the countries of the area through economic assistance as to decrease and remove their susceptibility to communist infiltration and subversion. The objective of the Doctrine is to enable the countries of the area to maintain their independence. Naturally, U.S. motives in this respect are not purely philanthropic. The United States believes that the best way to preserve its own independence is to assist other countries in the maintenance of their independence. This means freedom from all types of domination from whatever sources.

3. Military Assistance.

The Vice President said that he had noted that contrary to what he had heard in other countries, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister had made any mention of military assistance. He asked whether this reflects a judgment on their part that economic development must have priority over the building of larger armed forces. The Prime Minister confirmed the Vice President's analysis. He said that the country presently has excellent neighbors and does not feel threatened. In due course, it will want to expand and improve its armed forces, but it expects to do this from its own resources. First, however, it is anxious to develop the country and to create the economic base necessary to support an expanded military establishment.

The Vice President said that this is eminently sound and that he was glad to see that this question was viewed with such good sense.

4. Foreign Trade.

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The Foreign Minister stated that the Sudan is most anxious to expand its trade with the United States. At the present time, it earns only a comparatively few dollars from the export of gum arabic and hides and skins and from the operations of the U.S. diplomatic mission. He was hopeful that some means could be found of expanding the sale of Sudanese cotton in the United States. This is of the long staple variety and therefore not entirely competitive with American cotton. He mentioned, in this connection, the fact that the Sudan is losing part of its Indian market as the result of the sale of U.S. surplus cotton to that country and he had recently been forced to tell the Government of India that unless it resumes its former level of purchase of Sudanese cotton, the Sudan will be forced to cut its imports of Indian gray sheeting. The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Sudan's foreign cotton markets are generally assured because of the political situation in the Middle East. It is likely that both France and Great Britain will take little Egyptian cotton as compared to the past and that the Sudan will be able to sell more to those two countries. This, however, is only a temporary solution and the Sudan is most anxious to assure the retention of its regular markets.

The Vice President suggested that the Sudanese Government look into the possibility of increasing sales of cotton to the American market. He pointed out that we have a private enterprise economy and that the Sudan would therefore have to proceed through ordinary commercial channels. With respect to U.S. surplus disposal programs, he knew that it is the desire of the United States Government to endeavor to avoid disruption of normal commercial markets.

5. Communism.

The Prime Minister reiterated that the Government of the Sudan is strongly and openly opposed to communism. It believes that the best way to combat this menace is to give it complete freedom to operate above the surface rather than to drive it underground. Thus, there is a quasi-legal Communist Party which operates three newspapers. He did not think that communism had made very great inroads in the Sudan and seemed confident of his ability to cope with it, particularly if the economy can be strengthened and benefits demonstrated to the people. There has been some communist penetration of the University of Khartoum and estimates of the number of students who are communist-influenced run as high as fifty percent. However, it is his experience that those students usually forgot about communism once they graduate and assume their lifetime vocations. He noted, with respect to an inquiry by the Vice President, that there has also been some communist infiltration of Sudanese students at school in Egypt. In fact, the Egyptians have complained to him that the Sudanese are spreading communism in Egypt.

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The Foreign Minister spoke of the success which communist propaganda is achieving in various areas of the world. He thought that in general it is more effective than American propaganda. The communists are particularly attacking U.S. aid programs, which he and his colleagues in the Sudanese Government know are without conditions, but which the Communists represent as an effort at political domination by the U.S.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister whether he foresaw any difficulty from the communists or from any of the Near Eastern states, particularly Egypt, in accepting U.S. assistance. The Prime Minister replied that he does not intend to be deterred by the communists. As far as Egypt is concerned, it is hardly in a position to criticize since it has accepted American economic assistance itself.

6. Relations with Egypt.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister for his estimate of the situation in Egypt. The Prime Minister replied that he thought Nasser would be careful not to be taken over by the Soviets. He said that in a recent conversation with Nasser, he had asked the latter whether or not he was a communist and Nasser had replied emphatically in the negative. Nasser had added that he wished to have good relations with a foreign country called the Soviet Union but that he would not submit to the domination of any country. The Prime Minister went on to say that Nasser is a Moslem and has aspirations of leadership among the Moslem states. Most of the Moslems are aware of the menace of communism and for Nasser to embrace this heresy would be to throw away any pretensions he has to such leadership.

The Prime Minister went on to say that the Sudan does not presently feel menaced by Egypt. It is apparent from recent events in the area that Egypt does not possess the military capability for taking over any adjoining area by force. He said that the Sudan desires good relations with Egypt, but can not accept any Egyptian domination. Although Egypt earlier had aspirations to annex the Sudan, he thought that Nasser now realized, after more mature reasoning, that this would not be in Egypt's interest.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister if he had any suggestions to make as to what United States' policy should be toward Egypt. The Prime Minister said that he thought we should not attempt to strengthen Nasser, but should help him in small ways. He thought we should be careful not to do anything which would result in a further deterioration of relations between the U.K. and Egypt. He was sure that Nasser desired to resume relations with the U.K. as soon as possible and, in fact, Nasser had told him this in so many words shortly after the Anglo-French intervention in the Canal area.

7. The Sudan

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7. The Sudan and Africa.

The Vice President said that he had seemed to detect in the other African countries which he had visited a disposition to remain somewhat aloof from blocs and to act in the UN and otherwise in an independent manner. He thought that there was a growing tendency, in other words, for the states concerned to act in accordance with their own best interests, rather than to defer to the interests of others in the general area. The Prime Minister said that he thought that this was a correct interpretation. The Sudan desires close relations with countries in similar circumstances to its own, but it would, in the last analysis, act in accordance with its own best interests. He referred, in this connection, to the close relations which the Sudan is evolving with Ethiopia. He said that his country is most anxious to strengthen that relationship.

8. Nile Development.

The Vice President said that if he understood Sudan's policy correctly, it believes that the Nile should be developed on a cooperative basis by the riparian states concerned. The Foreign Minister confirmed this view, citing the importance of the river to the economies of all the states concerned.

9. Inflation.

The Vice President asked what the Prime Minister foresaw as the greatest danger to the Sudan at the present time. The Prime Minister unhesitatingly replied "inflation". He emphasized the low per capita income of the average Sudanese outside of the Gezira area and noted that inflationary trends could cause acute distress.

The Foreign Minister said that he would like to sum up the discussions by reiterating that the Sudan would give careful consideration to the Eisenhower program and would listen with attention to Ambassador Richards' further explanations. With regard to technical and developmental aid, the Government is confident that such assistance is offered by the United States without political conditions and the Sudan is therefore most desirous of receiving such aid.

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TAB E-8

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Tripoli, Libya
March 15, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS: Libyan: His Excellency Mustafa Ben Halim, Prime
Minister of Libya
Dr. Wahbi Al-Buri, Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs of Libya.

American: Vice President of the United States
Richard M. Nixon
Ambassador John L. Tappin
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2nd

The Prime Minister welcomed the Vice President and said that he was delighted that it had been possible to arrange to include Libya in the Vice President's tour of Africa. The Vice President said that he was most happy to be here and to have this opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister. He added that he was extremely disappointed that it had not been possible for him to get to Tobruk, as he had particularly wanted to pay his respect to and to talk with King Idris.

The conversation then ranged over the following subjects:

1. Libya's Foreign Relations

The Prime Minister said that he was most happy about the close relationship which exists between Libya and the United States. He thought that a great future was opening up for Africa in general and Northern Africa in particular. He spoke with concern about developments in the Middle East and the current situation in Egypt and Syria and said that he saw very little hope for the future with respect to those two countries. He said that Libya's foreign policy is predicated on the preservation of its independence. For this reason, he could not accept the leadership or domination of any other country. Cooperation among the Arab States, he emphasized, must be based upon the conception of "brotherhood". Such a concept does not admit of the existence of leadership, a fact which Egypt has not accepted. The Prime Minister went on to say that it is unfortunate but true that Libya has not been able to trust Nasser's word.

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He then reviewed the recent history of Egyptian-Libyan relations, including the activities of the Egyptian Military Attaché, the plot to assassinate Libyan Government leaders, the activities of the teachers, propaganda, etc. He went on to say that there are other like-minded states in North Africa who see the problem of relationships among the Arab States in the same way as Libya, and he thought that the great hope for the future lies in their cooperation. He mentioned specifically Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan and foresaw the future existence of a bloc which would include these states and Algeria, Ethiopia and possibly Saudi Arabia as well. He spoke in the highest terms of Bourguiba and the Sultan of Morocco and of the benefits to North Africa, the West and the Middle East of cooperation among them. He thought that a bloc such as he had described would prove to be a great attraction to the Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister whether Colonel Nasser is still popular among the masses in the Middle East and North Africa. The Prime Minister replied that unfortunately this is the case. He said that Nasser plays strongly on the Israel question to arouse the emotions of the Arab people and that he turns this against the US and the West. He went on to say that he does not agree with US-Israeli policy, but that he sees no point in insulting the US in this respect. The Arabs have only three places to go! The first is a close relationship with the Soviet Union, which is repugnant to Arabs on political, religious and ideological grounds and therefore can never be accepted. The second course is neutrality, which is impractical for any small state in the world today. This brings him, he said, the only possible alternative—a close relationship with the U.S., which has shown itself dedicated to the principle of the independence of small nations. The Prime Minister made it clear that in his judgment a close relationship with the U.S. was the only course of action compatible with Arab dignity and independence. He said he had often said to his friends in the other Arab states, including the Egyptians, that the most-hopeful means of changing U.S. policy with respect to Israel is to form a close relationship which will permit the Arabs to reason with and to influence the U.S. on this question.

2. Algeria

The Prime Minister said that the Algerian situation gave him great concern. He had recently talked to several of the FLN leaders who had told him that they were most fearful that the Communists would exploit the situation in Algeria, as they in fact are already attempting to do through the French Communist Party. The Prime Minister believed that there is a real danger that the prolongation of the struggle may facilitate the Communists' seizing control of the Nationalist group in Algeria to the great detriment of North Africa and the West. He expressed the strong hope that the U.S. would find it possible to influence

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France in this situation in a way which would remove this cancer on the body of North Africa.

3. The American Doctrine

The Prime Minister said that he had read President Eisenhower's statement five times and that he did not see how any Arab states could be opposed to the principles involved which seemed to him entirely compatible with Libyan foreign policy and the demands of the Middle East situation. He stated that he intends at the state dinner this evening to make a public statement to the effect that Libya welcomes the doctrine in principle and will discuss details with Ambassador Richards when he arrives here on March 17. The Prime Minister confessed to great disappointment at the communique which had resulted from the meeting of the four Arab leaders in Cairo on the occasion of King Saud's return from the U.S. He said that when King Saud earlier visited King Idris, the Libyans had worked out a draft text of a communique in which both Libya and Saudi Arabia would give endorsement to the Eisenhower doctrine. This draft had been based on a formula which had been generally acceptable to King Saud but was watered down by a member of King Saud's staff when reduced to writing. The Prime Minister went on to say that there was no question about Saud's agreement with the doctrine. It was apparent, however, that when the King reached Cairo, he was unable to make his views prevail with the other three Arab leaders and therefore unfortunately compromised on equivocal language which does not correspond to his true feelings. The Prime Minister said that this is a case in point where Arab solidarity on a basis of equality would have been salutary. Had all the Arab states been at this meeting instead of just four, there would have been an overwhelming sentiment for the Eisenhower Doctrine and Egypt and Syria, instead of Saudi Arabia, would have found themselves in a position of having to compromise for the sake of unity.

The Vice President said that he was most happy to hear of Libya's endorsement of the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He then went on to explain the philosophy which lay behind it. He said that he had observed in all the states he had visited in Africa a common determination on the part of those countries to maintain their independence and not to follow slavishly the lines of others through blocs, etc. He said that the Eisenhower Doctrine is intended to protect the independence of the states of the Middle East through the extension of security assurances and through the economic development of the countries concerned so as to enhance their capabilities to resist subversion. He stated that the U.S. is opposed to all forms of domination and, contrary to the impression the Communists endeavor to create, has no wish itself to dominate.

The Prime

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The Prime Minister said that he understood this. He thought the Eisenhower Doctrine is exactly what is required in the Middle East at the present time and he was happy to give his public endorsement to it this evening.

4. Foreign Aid

The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the assistance which the U.S. has extended to Libya, which has made a very great contribution to the development of the country. The Vice President asked which the Prime Minister felt had highest priority: military or economic development assistance. The Prime Minister replied that Libya needs to develop both aspects side-by-side. The building of an army is necessary to preserve Libya's security and the strengthening of its economy is necessary to the creation of stability.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister had any criticisms to make of the operation of U.S. programs. He said that he had noted a tendency elsewhere in the world to build up large staffs in capital cities which do not make the same contribution to the success of a program as do the technicians in the field. The Prime Minister replied that certain members of Parliament have been critical of the size of the USOM in Tripoli, but that he does not regard their criticisms as fair. He said that three years ago there had been many difficulties in connection with the administration of the Point IV projects but that great progress had since been made and he thought the situation now was good. Ambassador Tappin explained the workings of LAJAS and LARC, emphasizing the cooperative nature of both organizations. He thought that while these instruments are far from perfect, they nevertheless are doing a good job. The Prime Minister expressed his agreement and added that the major difficulty with the Point IV projects appears to arise from lack of funds. Often plans are drawn up as the result of great effort but funds are not available to implement them. The Vice President spoke of the desirability of concentrating on a few projects, rather than scattering aid with the result that no one project is successfully completed. He thought that it is a great waste to have people tied down in a capital drawing up plans which have no immediate prospect of realization. It would be much better to concentrate on a few projects which can be brought to completion.

5. Communism

The Prime Minister said that he thought that North Africa at the present time is comparatively free of Communist influence and could, with continued progress, remain that way. He reiterated that his greatest fear in this respect arises from the danger of Communist penetration in

Algeria

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Algeria. The Prime Minister then went on to emphasize his strong opposition to Communism. He spoke of the expanded Soviet Embassy staff in Tripoli, and said that the Government of Libya had recently requested the Soviets to reduce the size of their mission.

6. North African University

Mr. Palmer referred to a brief comment which the Prime Minister had made earlier about Libya's desire to build up its National University. He inquired whether Libya and the other North African states had given any thought to the possibility of pooling their resources to build a common university in North Africa which would serve the needs of all of them and which would, perhaps, enable them to build a more effective institution than their individual resources would permit. The Prime Minister said he had several discussions with Dr. Jamali of Iraq about this. Dr. Jamali had told him that he had talked to the Department of State about it and had urged the Department to try to find a means of establishing an American University somewhere in North Africa. The Prime Minister said that he thought this is an excellent idea and one which he hoped the U.S. could assist with. He did not think it made any great difference where the university was established—whether in Tripoli, Tunis, or Morocco. He felt that the U.S. would derive great benefit from initiating such a project under American auspices. Although this might cause criticism in some quarters, it would be generally welcomed.

The Vice President said he thought the idea of a North African University had great merit. He suggested the possibility of combining under one university administration a number of separate institutions in various North African centers in a manner analogous to the system at the University of California. Thus Tripoli might have a medical or an engineering school, Tunis an agricultural school, etc.

At a subsequent occasion after the Prime Minister's luncheon for the Vice President, the following items were touched upon:

1. Oil Development

The Prime Minister explained the hopes that he had for oil discovery in Libya, mentioning the promising strikes the French had made next door in Algeria. He said, in this connection, that the best route for a pipeline from the Algerian fields would appear to be through Tripoli. He added that he is very pleased with the large number of reputable American companies which are engaged in exploration activities in Libya and he ascribed this fact to the forward-looking oil legislation which Libya has enacted.

2. Private

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2. Private Enterprise

The Vice President said that he had noted in almost all countries he had visited in Africa that there is a growing awareness of the desirability of creating an atmosphere conducive to the attraction of private enterprise. He thought that this is a most encouraging development, since this is the greatest available source of capital for economic improvement. If countries can develop legislation which will at the same time embrace protection for themselves and extend assurances against arbitrary actions, they could benefit greatly from increased private investments. The Prime Minister expressed himself as being in entire agreement and said that Libya had already put legislation in effect which he thought would serve this purpose.

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STATE-FD-WASH., D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Embassy
Tunis, Tunisia
March 18, 1957

SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS: Tunisian: His Excellency Habib Bourguiba, Prime
Minister of Tunisia
His Excellency Mongi Slim, Tunisian
Ambassador to the United States
His Excellency Khemais Hajeri, Secretary
General of the Tunisian Foreign Office

American: Vice President of the United States
Richard M. Nixon
Ambassador G. Lewis Jones
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2nd.

The Vice President expressed his appreciation for the very warm and friendly welcome which had been accorded him upon his arrival. He said that it was evident that this greeting was intended for the United States and not for Mrs. Nixon and himself personally. He was particularly impressed because the sentiments obviously flowed from the hearts of the people.

The Prime Minister said that this was indeed a sincere manifestation of the deep respect in which the US is held in Tunisia. The people reacted with such enthusiasm because they understand the policies of the US and feel that they correspond with their own hopes and aspirations. He went on to speak of Tunisia's wholehearted commitment to the cause of democracy, liberty and peace. He said that during the darkest days of Tunisia's struggle for liberation, he and his colleagues had never wavered in their devotion to the cause of democracy, even though they were being subjugated by a democratic power. There were many in France who had maintained that Tunisia could never maintain an independent existence. Tunisia is now completing the first year of its independence and, although there are many problems ahead, it has been demonstrated that the nation is able to exercise the responsibilities of liberty. The Prime Minister went on to say that Tunisia is fully committed to the West. It can never be neutral and it can never accept Communism, which it repudiates as contrary to its ideals and principles. This

attitude

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attitude accords with the will of the entire Tunisian people and is not an attitude simply laid down by himself and other leaders. It therefore represents a firm foundation for the building of the Tunisian state.

The Prime Minister continued within this context by emphasizing the particular importance which Tunisia attaches to its ties with the United States, with which it feels at one on questions of principle and ideology. Generally speaking, Tunisia approves American policies, knowing that they are dedicated to the concept of independence and of peace. Thus, he said, he had spoken out in support of the Eisenhower Doctrine because it seemed to him the only sensible course in the Middle East at the present time and because he knew that it would enhance the cause of independence and the requirements of stability in that vital area. The Prime Minister said that there have been other instances in which Tunisia does not see eye to eye with the US but, in such cases, he has been at pains to explain to the Tunisian people why it is that the US has felt compelled to act in a manner contrary to that which had been hoped for. As a consequence, even though the Tunisian people do not always agree with the US, they generally understand and respect our policies and actions.

The Vice President expressed his gratitude for these sentiments. He called attention to the fact that Bourguiba was the first Arab leader to speak out publicly in favor of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He emphasized that the President is aware of this fact, deeply appreciates it, and had asked the Vice President to convey his gratitude to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister next spoke of the importance which Tunisia assumes in the North African and Middle Eastern area. He spoke of his country as a "pilot project" for the development of stability, moderation and pro-Westernism in this part of the world. If Tunisia should fail, either because of the Algerian problem or through failure to develop economically and socially, the consequent blow to democracy and stability in these areas of the world would be very great indeed. But if Tunisia is successful, it will serve as a shining example of how democracy can be made to work. Thus, it will counter the false promises of Communism, which are devoted to objectives quite opposite from those for which the US and Tunisia stand.

The Prime Minister then turned to the Algerian question, which he characterized as fundamental to the future development and orientation of North Africa. He emphasized that he desires close relations with France because of the historic and cultural ties which bind the countries and also because of the complementary nature of their economies. He decried the fact that there are still colonial

and militarist

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and militarist elements who are influential within France and who cannot accept the fact of Tunisian independence. These elements, he said, are responsible for the continuation of the war in Algeria. They would subjugate Algeria and then seize the opportunity to re-subjugate Tunisia and Morocco. There are, of course, elements in France who understand that France can never solve the Algerian problem by a program of force and who would therefore welcome an accommodation between France and the Algerian peoples which would accord with the legitimate aspirations of the latter. Unfortunately, these good elements are neither vocal nor influential. They are afraid to speak up in defense of their convictions, because they see the Algerian war prosecuted by a socialist government and ask themselves why they should be more liberal than the socialists in this matter.

In response to the Vice President's questions, the Prime Minister said that he thought that there is the basis for a settlement in Algeria on the basis of free elections with some type of international supervision. It is necessary, however, that these elections be conducted in such a way as to permit the Algerian people to decide freely their own future. In the absence of such a settlement, he despaired about the future of North Africa. The continuation of the war in Algeria is poisoning all of North Africa. Tunisia has 200,000 Algerian refugees within its borders which constitute a drain on its economy and a constant security problem. The prolongation of the war, moreover, gives the French pretext for deploying their forces within Tunisian territory in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty of the nation. He said that the Tunisian people cannot understand why the French should be able to deploy their forces in friendly and independent Tunisian territory. He pointed out that the British and U.S. Ambassadors did not have the right to conduct large-scale military ceremonies within a sovereign Tunisia and that it is difficult to explain particularly to other Arab states, why the French should have such rights. Moreover, the continuation of the Algerian war is weakening the position of the moderate elements in the Algerian nationalist movement. At the present time, there are Algerian leaders who are anti-Communist and moderate, but there is great danger that, if the war drags on, the responsible leadership in Algeria will be forced to give way to irresponsible elements.

The Vice President then inquired about Tunisia's developmental needs. The Prime Minister replied that his country stands in great need of American assistance. He noted with pleasure that negotiations are under way, which he hoped could be speeded up and culminated just as quickly as possible. Tunisia's principal need is to develop the agricultural base of its economy and to supplement this with some industrial development. He hoped that US assistance, the program and details of which are yet to be negotiated, would be devoted to

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this end. He spoke particularly about the need for settling Tunisia's nomadic population on the land. He said that he has always regarded US assistance as supplementary to that of France, but that he is becoming increasingly concerned about the situation in which Tunisia now finds itself. The question of aid to Morocco and Tunisia has become a domestic political issue in France, with the result that Tunisia's essential developmental needs have become subject to the whim of local French party politics. He pled for the US not to abandon Tunisia to France in this way. He pointed out that the Tunisian fiscal year has only a few days to run and as yet there is no agreement with France on aid programs for this year. He pled for "substantial" US assistance which would permit Tunisia to be truly independent of France.

After luncheon on March 19, the Vice President had an opportunity to talk to Deputy Prime Minister Ladgham, with Ambassador Jones, Mr. Palmer, Ambassador Slim and Secretary General Hajeri present.

The Vice President asked Mr. Ladgham for his views on the Arab-Israeli problem. Mr. Ladgham pointed out the different attitudes which prevail in Tunisia and North Africa toward the question of the Jews and the Palestine problem from those which exist in the Middle East. He indicated that Tunisia does not share the view of the Middle Eastern Arab states that Israel should be liquidated and made it clear that Tunisia does not approve of Colonel Nasser's policies on this and other Middle Eastern and African problems. He indicated his belief that there is a large element of imperialist ambition in Nasser's philosophy and actions.

The Vice President said that he had been struck in the several countries of Northern Africa which he had visited by the devotion of these nations to the cause of independence. He said he had the impression that all of these countries would vigorously oppose any effort at domination and would do their utmost to preserve their independence. Thus, he gathered that there is a growing tendency for these countries not to participate in blocs to the extent of slavishly following the dictates of any one country. Instead, they are tending more and more to view their problems on their merits and to preserve the necessary independence of action. This is not to deny that on many issues they will see as one with many of the Afro-Asian bloc, but he thought it significant and important that there is a growing tendency to deal with issues on their merits. Mr. Ladgham concurred with the Vice President's statement which he said represents the Tunisian point of view.

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The Vice President went on to speak of the central importance of the Arab refugee problem in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue. He acknowledged that many attempts have been made to deal with this problem, but none of them have been effective so far. He felt that a new approach to this matter is of the utmost importance. Mr. Ladgham agreed completely with this viewpoint.

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